University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2000

The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First
Amendment
Michael Vitiello
University of the Pacific, mvitiello@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1175 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles/616

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of
the First Amendment
MICHAEL

VITIELLO*

The NurembergFiles,an anti-abortionwebsite with both graphicimages as
well aspersonal information about abortiondoctors, lists the names of abortion
doctors, their addresses, and other personal information, noting the healthy
abortion doctors in black type, "wounded" abortion doctors in gray, and
murdered persons with lines through their names. Together with "wanted"
posters of abortion doctors, a magazine promoting and celebrating abortion
clinic violence, a yearly banquet honoringthose imprisonedfor acts of abortion
violence, and a book about the use offorce againstabortionistsentitled "A Time
to Kill," the members of the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA)
maintained that these expressions were entitled to full First Amendment
protectionaspurelypoliticalspeech, spoken in opposition to abortionrights.
This FirstAmendment defense was rejected by the U.S. District Court of
Oregon in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, finding
that the defendants' conduct was a true threat of violence in violation of the
Freedom ofAccess to ClinicEntrancesAct of 1994 (FACE), requiringboth legal
and injunctive relief In the face of much criticism of the verdict, criticism
focused on the FirstAmendment protection of such volatile speech, Professor
Vitiello argues that ifthe Brandenburg test of incitement to imminent lawless
action allows prohibition of any speech, it would allow the prohibition of the
speech ofACLA. Professor Vitiello argues that, viewed in its entirety, within a
context of abortion clinic violence that the defendants supported, encouraged,
andpromoted, the speech of ACA falls outside the bounds of protectedFirst
Amendment speech, and is properlysubjected to civil andcriminalpenalty.

* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; J.D., University
of Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to extend special thanks to
Dean Gerald Caplan for his continued support of scholarship at McGeorge. I am extremely
appreciative of the excellent research efforts of my research assistants Loris L. Bakken and
Andrew Wilson. I first presented this article as a work in progress during the summer of 1999 to
a group of my colleagues and friends whose comments, although skeptical, were extremely
helpful. They may not want to be associated with my ultimate conclusions but I want to
acknowledge their help. Thanks to Alan Brownstein (U.C. Davis), Julie Davies, Joshua
Dressier, Ruth Jones, Dorothy Landsberg, Larry Levine, David Miller, Beth O'Neill, Terrie
Robinson (University of Mississippi), my former research assistant Jenna L. Clark, and special
thanks to Brian Landsberg, who not only hosted the session but also has continued to offer
helpful feedback on a number of drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Ms. Maria
Vullo, one of the capable attorneys representing Planned Parenthood in the litigation discussed
in this article, for her insights and comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Professors
Robert F. Nagel and Adeno Addis for their helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement agencies and organizations that monitor hate groups have
recognized the increased risk created by access to the Internet.' As reported by the
New York Times, law enforcement agents are concerned that hate groups target
isolated individuals ripe for their message of hate.2 Websites, inexpensive to
create and largely unregulated, may inspire lone wolves to commit violent acts.
Unlike more traditional hate groups that government agencies have infiltrated,
modem hate groups and the potential millions of visitors to their websites cannot
be effectively monitored
Governmental regulation of hate sites raises immediate First Amendment
concerns. Modem First Amendment case law has limited the ability of the
government to ban hate speech, even when it advocates unlawful conduct. As
long as the speech remains abstract advocacy, rather than incitement to imminent
violence, the speech is protected by the First Amendment.4 But, in light of the
inability of the government to monitor individuals inspired to act by hate sites, the
cost of First Amendment protection has increased. Society, in effect, is
subsidizing hate groups who can spread their messages at minimal cost over the
Internet with little fear of reprisal.
I Hate Crime on the Internet: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Hatch, Hate CrimeHearings] (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary); News Release, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch Before the Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on Hate Crime
on the Internet (Sept. 14, 1999), availableat http'//www.senate.gov/-judiciary/91499ogh.htm
("rihe Southern Poverty Law Center... which individually tracked sites for 254 hate groups
in January of this year-up 50% from one year ago. And another group... the Anti-

Defamation League-estimated the presence of some 500-600 hate groups on the web this
June.").
2 See Jo Thomas, New Face ofTerrorCrimes: 'Lone Wolf Weaned on Hate,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16,1999, atAl.
The notion being preached in pamphlets, on telephone lines and on white supremacist websites
is that of the romantic, heroic loner who fights his own private war, committing violent acts
against the Government Jews and racial minorities. A warrior working alone, supremacist
leaders say, cannot be betrayed or infiltrated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a fate that
has befallen some hate groups.
Id.
3 Hatch,Hate CrimeHearings,supra note 1.
mhese hate groups can be remarkably sophisticated, carefully avoiding obvious and explicit
appeals to racism and anti-Semitism. Sometimes, the sites are disguised as personal home
pages, with displays about innocent enough sounding topics as city biographies or historical
figures. Scroll down from sites about Santa Barbara (California), or Martin Luther King, Jr.,
however, and what you will find is a rancid torrent ofneo-Nazi invective.
4 See infra Part mR.B-D.
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In February, 1999, a federal jury in Portland, Oregon, awarded several
plaintiffs $107 million in damages against fourteen individual defendants and two
radical anti-abortion groups.5 Much of the litigation focused on whether the
Nuremberg Files, 6 a website created by some of the defendants, amounted to a
threat within the meaning of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994 (hereinafter FACE). 7 The website included personal information about
abortion providers in a context seemingly calculated to inspire violence against
those named on its pages and may have contributed to the death of at least one
doctor.8 The PlannedParenthoodlitigation offers a case study involving the use
of the Internet to spread a message of hate to thousands, and possibly millions, of
readers, at minimal cost. Despite the website's message of violence, main stream
media and First Amendment advocates have argued that the verdict is an attack
on the First Amendment 9
5

Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130

(D. Or. 1999).
6 The Nuremberg Files appeared, in hard copy form, as a box of files containing personal
identifying information on abortion doctors. Id. at 1133. The Nuremberg Files website
contained information taken from the hard copy files. Id. at 1133-34. The website was
originally hosted on the servers of MindSpring Enterprises. After the decision in the Planned
Parenthoodcase, MindSpring shut down the site on February 5, 1999, stating that the site was
in violation of their appropriate use policy and that MindSpring had no plans to restore it. The
Nuremberg Files soon reappeared under the domain of Plebeian Systems. OneNet
Communications, however, threatened to cut off Internet access to the smaller company if it did
not remove the site. The site was then shut down again. Eric Silverberg et al., The Nuremberg
Files CS 201 FinalProject,at http://www-cse.stanford.edu/classes/cs2Ol/projects/nurembergfiles/backgroundthtml (last visited Oct 10, 2000) [hereinafter Stanford Class Project] (on file
with the Ohio State Law Journal). Karen Spaink, a Dutch citizen, published the Nuremberg
Files on her website explaining that although she completely disagreed with the views of the
creators of the Nuremberg Files on the issue of abortion, she did believe in free speech. Two
days later she decided to take the Nuremberg Files off of the Internet stating, "The debate about
the use some perverts may or not make of the list is so heated that I decided to take it down. Yet
I still believe that lists are part of free speech." Karen Spaink, The NurembergFiles:Motivation
and Introduction, at http.//www.xs4al.nl/-kspainldnuremberg/aborts.html (last updated on
July 16, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). As late as August 2000, the
Nuremberg Files website was hosted by Internet Freedom, at http://www.netfreedom.org.
However, although the new publication of the site was very close to the original form, it was
not exactly the same. The lists appeared on the site as well as the gruesome pictures and
descriptions of why the site existed. In October 2000, as this article went to press, although the
Nuremberg Files were not available on the Web, the administrators of Internet Freedom told the
editors that this was due only to technical server problems and that the site would be available
again soon. Visualize Abortionists on Trial: The Nuremberg Files, http'/wwwfetfreedor.netl
nuremberg/index.html [hereinafter Nuremberg Files] (hard copy, made June 24, 1999, on file
with author and the Ohio State Law Journal).
7 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
8 See infraPart I.D.2.
9 See infraPart II.B.
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Examination of the PlannedParenthoodlitigation raises important questions
about the scope of modern First Amendment case law. Critics of the judgment in
PlannedParenthoodportray the defendant as engaged in political speech, at most
advocating violence in the abslract.10 Further complicating the issue, the
Nuremberg Files website did not expressly urge viewers to commit violence
against abortion providers. But the website provided inspiration to do so and, by
providing personal information about abortion providers, the site gave
information helpful to those who were inspired to kill.'1 The litigation invites the
question, did the defendants cross the line between advocacy and incitement.
Careful review of the Supreme Court's case law also suggests ways in which state
and federal governments may be able to criminalize dangerous hate groups.
Part II of this article examines the defendants' conduct that gave rise to the
PlannedParenthoodlitigation.' 2 Part DI discusses the Supreme Court's case law
governing incitement to violence. It reviews the pre-Brandenburg cases,
especially the clear and present danger test as Justices Holmes and Brandeis
would have applied it, in a series of dissenting opinions.' 3 It then discusses the
emergence of the Brandenburgtest and its progeny, focusing on some of the
uncertainty created by those opinions.14 While those cases leave numerous
questions unresolved, Part III also argues that some of those questions ought to be
resolved in light of the underlying justifications for the First Amendment.
Specifically, for example, insofar as the First Amendment advances self
government or leads to the truth through a marketplace of competing ideas,
speech creating a risk of harm to individuals is outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. 15 Indeed, almost exclusively, the Supreme Court's
incitement case law has involved speakers critical of governmental policy. 16 The
Nuremberg Files goes beyond criticizing the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine
and targets private individuals, speech entitled to less protection than speech
involving political dissent.' 7 Part IV discusses whether the Nuremberg Files
website, especially when considered in conjunction with other of the defendants'
activities, is entitled to First Amendment protection.' 8 It concludes that, contrary
to the view that the website is "part of vitriolic public debate over abortion," 19 the
10 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
11 See infranote 52 and accompanying text.
12

See infra Part II.

13 See infra Part ImA-C.
14 See infra Part Il.C-D.
15 See infra notes 342-47 and accompanying text.
16 See infranotes 338-43 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
18 See infra Part lV.
19

Lawrence Viele, Murder or Free Speech? Website Won't Back Down inAbortion

Fight,FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Feb. 8, 1999, [hereinafter Viele, Newspaper Article],
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Fulton County Daily Report.
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Planned Parenthood defendants crossed the line between advocacy and
incitement. 20 It concludes further that, in light of proven risk to human life and the
limited deterrent value of a civil damages award, prosecutors should use the
21
criminal law to protect those at risk.

II. THE NuREMBERG FILES
A. An Overview ofthe Litigation
On October 26, 1995, two not-for-profit corporations that provide abortion
services, and several doctors who perform abortions, filed an action in federal
district court in Portland, Oregon, in which they named two Portland-based
associations and several individual defendants active in the radical anti-abortion
movement. 22 Among other claims, the complaint alleged that the defendants
violated FACE, which created a private right of action for a person harmed by
another who "by... threat of force... intentionally ... intimidates.., or
attempts to... intimidate... any person because that person is or has
been... providing reproductive health services."2 3 The plaintiffs requested both
24
compensatory damages and injunctive relief
The complaint alleged a number of specific acts of intimidation, most of
which related to publication of "unwanted" or "wanted" posters of abortion
providers, which included personal information about the doctors and their
families 2 5 After the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, but
'26
before trial, several of the defendants helped to create the "Nuremberg Files.
Initially, the Nuremberg Files consisted of a box of fies containing personal
information about doctors who performed abortions. 27 In January, 1997, Neal
Horsley, not a defendant in the case, created the Nuremberg Files website on the
Intemet.28 The Nuremberg Files named some of the plaintiffs among those who
20 See infra Part IL.D.2.
21 See infraPart IV.B .3.
22
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355

(D. Or. 1996).
23
Id. at 1362; 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994); see also Stanford ClassProject,supra note 6.
24
PlannedParenthood,945 F. Supp. at 1365.
25
See infa part II.D2.
26
See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
27
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132
(D. Or. 1999); Brief of Amicus CuriaeACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Planned Parenthood
v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-35320) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus
Brief], available at http://www.aclu.org/court/plannedparenthood_v_aclf.html

(last visited

Oct. 10, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
28
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187
(D. Or. 1998).
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would be brought to justice for taking innocent lives.2 9 The district court ruled
that evidence concerning the Nuremberg Files was admissible in the Planned
Parenthoodcase.30
In February 1999, the jury entered a verdict in excess of $100 million against
the defendants. 31 Shortly thereafter, the district court granted permanent
injunctive relief ordering the defendants to desist from specific unlawful
32
conduct.
B. Reaction to the Verdict
Not surprisingly, the defendants argued in the district court that the First
Amendment protected their conduct.3 3 Post-verdict, they have continued to argue
that the litigation was an attack on their free speech rights. For example, one of
the defendants stated, "There's been only one death threat in this entire case and
that's the threat to the First Amendment. '34 A second defendant stated that it was
"a strategic lawsuit against political participation." 35 Horsley summed up the
position of the defendants when he stated that "all we've done, and all really
anybody's accused us of doing, is printing factually verifiable information.... If
the First Amendment does not allow a publisher to publish factually verifiable
36
information, then I don't understand what the First Amendment's about."
Mainline commentators have joined abortion foes in raising First
Amendment concerns about the PlannedParenthoodlitigation. Some newspaper
29

See infranotes 147-50 and accompanying text.
See PlannedParenthood,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. Although it did not explicitly state the
evidence was admissible, the court did allow it to be heard.
31 ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 27. The defendants have now appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
32
PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
30

33

See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; PlannedParenthood,23 F. Supp. 2d

at 1191.
34
Patricia C. Roberts, $109 Million in DamagesAgainst Pro-life Website, CHRsmirrY
TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at http://www.christianityonline.com/ctI9t3/9t3020.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
35Id
36

Stanford Class Project,supranote 6. Other anti-abortion activists agree. For example,
one long time anti-abortion activist began photographing people entering a Planned Parenthood
clinic in Spokane, Washington, out of anger with the judgment, which she saw as "an

infringement on free speech and the right to oppose abortion." Bill Morlin, Abortion Protester
Tries New Tactic; Woman Vows to Send Photos of Local Doctors, Patients to 'Nuremberg
Files,'SPOKANESPOKEsMAN-REViEW, Mar. 7, 1999, at B1.Neal Horsley, appearing on a panel

discussing the dilemma created by hate speech cases, contended that the site never condoned
attacks on doctors and told the audience that "[n]ow that I've been silenced, the possibility of
violence is greater." Monica Whitaker, Anti-Abortion Website at Core of Hate Speech Talks,
TENNESSFAN, Mar. 10, 1999, at lB.
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editorials argued that the Nuremberg Files amounted to protected speech. For
example, one newspaper editorialized that the site is objectionable, distasteful and
troubling. But that, according to the paper, is exactly the kind of speech that the
37
First Amendment is intended to protect.
Prominent First Amendment advocates have also questioned the verdict. For
example, Paul McMasters, the First Amendment ombudsman at the Freedom
Forum, believes that an appellate court may reverse the judgment because the jury
instructions set the standard of liability too low. 38 He contends that, despite the
objectionable nature of the speech, "the verdict has significant implications for all
37

Shielding an Anti-Abortion Hit List, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 1999, at B6;
see also Peter Bronson, Editorial, Net Losses, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 5, 1999, at A22
(arguing that although the site was offensive, it did not explicitly advocate violence-instead,
the threat was implicit-and further arguing the anti-abortion group was clearly engaging in
political speech, the kind the First Amendment was designed to protect); Dick Helm, Editorial,
Freedom of Speech Takes it on the Chin, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 1999, at 6A (arguing
that the ruling against the site has slapped the First Amendment and our Constitution in the
face; and further arguing that in a cause considered politically correct, the justice system is
making an assumption that the free speech is going to lead to violence); Legal, But Dangerous,
PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at 16A (arguing that the repulsive website contains no direct
threat, though it may have the same effect and that even the updating to cross off names of
physicians who were killed is commentary, however twisted and hypocritical; and further
arguing that appeals courts are likely to overtur the verdict); Let 'Nuremberg' Site Stand,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at 16A (arguing that abortion is the most combustible
issue of our day and all the Nuremberg site does is reflect this; and further arguing that if this
country is still committed to free speech, the courts will not force it to turn down the heat); Ellen
Wilson, Editorial, Website may be vile, but it'sprotected, ATLANTA J., Jan. 18, 1999, at 12A
(defending Neal Horsley's right to post such "garbage" because it is the same right that allows
her to call him a"hate-mongering idiof' and to argue just as vehemently against his views).
38
See Viele, Newspaper Article, supra note 19; see generally Leigh Noffsinger, Wanted
Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats From
Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1209 (1999) (discussing the Planned
Parenthood decision and proposing a "synthesized test under which juries first would apply a
four-part definition to distinguish threats from political advocacy, and second determine
whether the speech poses a likelihood of imminent violence"); Robert D. Richards, The "True
Threat" to Cyberspace: Shredding the First Amendment for Faceless Fears, 7 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 291,292-93 (1999).
The messages on the Nuremberg files site contained no explicit threat of or direct incitement to
violence, raising the question of whether new remedies were indeed construed by the jury in its
application of this law. If no explicit threat was made against abortion doctors on the web page,
the question becomes why did the jury reach its conclusion and award such a massive amount
of damages?
The magnitude of the verdict arguably reflects the jury's discomfort with or perhaps
apprehension of the internet as a communications medium.
Id In the most substantial discussion of the issue to date, Professor Steven Gey reaches a
similar conclusion. Steven G. Gey, The Nuremburg Files and the FirstAmendment Value of
Threats,78 TEX. L. REV.541 (2000).
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kinds of other speech."39 Professor Rodney A. Smolla argues that the Nuremberg
Files website does not support a charge of accessory to murder. Instead, the
website is "part of a vitriolic public debate over abortion." Smolla believes that
"[m]uch of what is on [the website] comes with a presumption that it is violent
rhetoric and hyperbole as opposed to actual incitement or aiding or abetting
40
murder."
University of Virginia Law Professor Robert O'Neal, director of the Thomas
Jefferson Center for Free Expression, agrees that the website is entitled to First
Amendment protection. For proof of "a direct incitement to lawless action,"
argues O'Neal, "t]he message really has to be directed to the person, which
posting something on a Website is not."4 1
Despite substantial sentiment that the website is entitled to First Amendment
protection, the question of First Amendment protection is far closer than
commentators have suggested. As developed below, that is so for at least three
reasons. One, the Supreme Court case law does not create an absolute protection
for speakers whose impassioned rhetoric leads to violence. Even its cases most
protective of passionate rhetoric suggest that the First Amendment does not
protect a speaker in all settings.4 2 Two, the characterization of the Nuremberg
Files that has emerged in the post-verdict press has understated the extent to
which the website called viewers to commit acts of violence. 43 Three,
commentators have ignored the larger context in which the defendants published
the Nuremberg Files. If they were charged with inciting others to commit
violence, a court would have to assess the defendants' entire course of conduct,
44
even if in isolation the website was entitled to First Amendment protection.

39

40

Viele, Newspaper Article, supra note 19.
Id. A number of other commentaries raise similar concerns about the litigation. A

speaker at a conference hosted by the Media Institute included the Planned Parenthood
litigation among the bad news for the First Amendment. After noting "a menacing trend," he
stated that "[t]his year, once again, the publishers of a website called the Nuremberg File [sic]
were held to be responsible, if indirectly, for the actions of third parties taken against abortion
providers .... [This area... does constitute a very less promising area, indeed." Id. A lawyer
who once served as vice chairman for the New York Ymes argued that the website contained no
clear and unambiguous threat to any particular person and concluded that "[w]e are left with a
case that started -with alleged threats to doctors and ended with threats to all Websites and all
media."Id
41 Id.

42 See infra Part Im.C-D.
43
See infraPart IV.A.

44See infra Part IV.A-B.1. Professor Gey's recently published article makes the same
mistake when he argues that the Nuremburg Files is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Professor Gey reaches his conclusion, in large part, by ignoring the additional evidence
introduced at trial and the context in which the PlannedParenthooddefendants published the
Nuremburg Files. Gey, supranote 38.
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C. The NurembergFiles
The Nuremberg Files website is powerful material. The creators of the
Nuremberg Files chose the name to create a parallel to the Nuremberg Trials
conducted after World War It.45 Its creators argue that abortion is a violation of
natural law and that abortion is legal only because of the Supreme Court's
exercise of raw judicial power, an act contrary to the Constitution 4 6 Thus,
because Roe v. Wade47 was lawless, and because at some future date, some
48
natural disaster "might cause the normal order of government to break down,"
the creators of the files began collecting information about abortion providers and
their supporters to preserve evidence for when they are put on trial for mass
murder and to prevent them from escaping justice as some Nazi war criminals
were able to do after the war.4 9
The website included a caption "Visualize Abortionists on Trial; The
Nuremberg Files," and a picture of a woman in a jury box pointing an accusing
finger at a man, apparently a doctor on trial for performing abortions. Below that
picture was a line of dripping blood. 50 The site also accused the doctors of various
51
crimes, including genocide, mass murder, and infanticide.
The site also asked readers to send information about abortion providers and
their supporters, including clinic owners, security personnel, judges, and
politicians supportive of abortion rights. The information sought included not just
names, but also photographs or videotapes of the doctors, their vehicles, homes,
and friends. The site also requested personal data including date and place of
birth, home and business addresses and phone numbers, Social Security numbers,
license plate numbers, names and birth dates of spouses, children and friends,
criminal records, driving records, mug shots, fingerprint cards, civil suit records,
depositions, divorce files, affidavits of former employees, former patients, former
45

NurembergFiles,supranote 6.

46

REV.MICHAEL BRAY, A TIME TO KILL: A STUDY CONCERNING THE USE OF FORCE AND

ABORTION 116-17 (1994) [hereinafter A TIME TO KILL].
47
48

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
An Indictmentfor Murder, at http://www.alaweb.cor--savbabys/ndictment.html (last

visited Oct. 11, 2000)(onfile
with the Ohio State Law Journal).
49

See Nuremberg Files, supra note 6.Inthe text, I use the past tense to describe the

Nuremberg Files. The Planned Parenthooddefendants have distanced themselves from the
website and Horsley continues to make changes to the website. The text describes the website at

the time of the PlannedParenthoodlitigation.
50
Id.
This most recent version of the site has undergone changes from the original version.
The site now states that there will be live web cams soon placed outside of abortion clinics to
watch people going in and out. The new version also displays a list of links to news articles
about the site.
51 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment at 33, Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130
(D.Or. 1999) (No. CIV. 95-1671-JO) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum].
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video, and anything else that might help to
spouses, newspaper clippings, news
52
convict the abortion providers
The site had a link to a section about doctors who perform third trimester
53
abortions and another link to a full page of gruesome pictures of aborted fetuses.
It also invited viewers to access the names already collected.54 Listed were the
names of over 250 doctors (as the site calls them, "the baby butchers"), numerous
clinic owners and workers ("their weapons and bearers"), judges ("their
shysters"), politicians ("their mouthpieces'), law enforcement ("their
bloodhounds"), and "miscellaneous spouses and other blood flunkies." 55 The
page was captioned "Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices." The page
contained another line of dripping blood and a legend explaining how the list
works.56 If a name was listed in black, the person was still working; if in gray, the
person had been wounded; if a line appeared through a name, that person had
58
been killed.57 Throughout the site, viewers were asked to send more names.
Another link offered a viewer the office addresses for the people listed on the
site.59 The site creators made numerous calls for "justice," 60 including the
conviction and execution of abortion providers. A companion page on the website
argued that the murder of abortion providers is morally justified and contained a
letter from Paul Hill, currently on death row in Florida, describing the joy that he
experienced after murdering a doctor and his body guard.
52

61

See Nuremberg Files, supra note 6; see also Skipp Porteous, Banquet of the White

Rose, ALBION MONITOR, Feb. 18, 1996, at http//www.monitor.nettmonitor/abortion/
whiterose.html [hereinafter Porteous, Newspaper Article] (on file with the Ohio State Law

Journal).
"The goal of the project," according to David Crane, the group's national director, "will be
to gather all available information on abortionists and their accomplices for the day when they
may be formally charged and tried at Nuremberg-type trials for their crimes. The information in
these files will be specifically that kind of evidence admissible in a court of law."...
"We don't want to make the mistakes that allowed so many Nazis to escape justice after
World War II," said Paul deParrie, one of the assistants involved in the project.

Id.

53

See NurembergFiles,supra note 6.
54Id.
55

Id
56 Id
57 Id
58

Id.

59

Id.
Id (We

60

anticipate the day when these people will be charged in PERFECTLY
LEGAL COURTS once the tide of this nation's opinion turns against the wanton slaughter of
These classes of individuals are all committing various
God's children (as it surely will)....
crimes to which they should answer.").
61
Id; see also Stanford Class Project,supra note 6 (explaining that the essay by Hill is
titled "Why I Shot an Abortionist," in which Hill writes, "It was unpleasant for me to have to
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According to its defenders, the Nuremberg Files website is powerful
advocacy, representing an unpopular political position. As such, it is entitled to
First Amendment protection, contrary to the ruling of the trial court in Planned
Parenthood.As developed below, that argument misses the point.62
D. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Advocates
1. The Defendants' Support of Violence
Despite post-verdict commentary, Planned Parenthoodwas about far more
than the Nuremberg Files. Instead, the Nuremberg Files website was only one
piece of evidence demonstrating the defendants' threatening conduct and
63
commitment to violence.
To prevail under FACE, the plaintiffs had to prove that the defendants'
conduct amounted to a threat of violence. 64 The plaintiffs amassed considerable
evidence, occurring over several years and involving far more than just the
Nuremberg Files. Much of the conduct preceded the creation of the website by
65
several years.
The American Coalition of Life Activists (hereinafter ACLA),66 one of two
organizations named as a defendant was formed in 1994 when it split from more
mainline pro-life groups because of ACLA's insistence that violence against
abortion providers was justified. 67 Most of the individual defendants were
actively involved in ACLA activities. 68 Many of the individual defendants signed
a document approving of the 1993 murder of a doctor who performed abortions.
They also refused to commit to non-violence at a national meeting of pro-life
groups. "Because [many of the defendants] advocated the use of 'force' and
justifiable homicide, they were no longer allowed to be leaders of Operation
69
Rescue and therefore agreed to form a new organization that became ACLA."
Co-defendant Andrew Bumett, ACLA co-founder and the executive director of

kill two human beings-even though one was a murderer and the other his accomplice. But the
privilege of being used to save innocent children continues to change this unpleasantness into
joy.").
62

See infra Part IV.
63 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186
(D. Or. 1998).
64
65

1 d at 1188.
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1362-63

(D. Or. 1998).
66

Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1131

(D. Or. 1999); see generallyViele, Newspaper Article, supranote 19.
67 PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
68
See id
69

Id.
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Advocates for Life Ministries (hereinafter ALM), made clear ACLA's
commitment to violence against abortion providers when he stated that "if
someone was to condemn any violence against abortion, they probably wouldn't
have felt comfortable working with us." 70
All of the defendants were involved in ACLA activities and none
disapproved of its goals or activities.71 Those activities included its continued
support of the White Rose Banquet, a function "to honor 'prisoners of Christ,'
72
those confined to prison for their anti-abortion criminal activities." Co3
defendant Michael Bray hosted the banquet in 1996 and 1997.Y The White Rose
Calendar, published by co-defendant Bruce Murch and distributed at the banquet,
"commemorates anti-abortion violence and its perpetrators." 74 The calendar
displayed photographs of the wreckage of bombed abortion clinics and of various
individuals who have committed anti-abortion violence. On its cover, the calendar
included a photograph of Paul Hill, who murdered an abortion provider and a
member of his security detail. Hill was portrayed with a sign supporting the
murder of abortion providers. As developed in more detail below, ACLA also
"unveiled" the Deadly Dozen poster (a document which included names and
other information about abortion providers) and the Nuremberg Files at different
75
events sponsored by the organization.
The other organization named as a defendant, ALM, was closely associated
with ACLA. 76 ALM published a magazine, distributed internationally, that has
published articles advocating the use of force to disrupt abortion services. 7 7 The
70

Id

71 Id at 1137.
72
Id.at 1138; see alsoPortious, Newspaper Article, supra note 52.
73 PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
74 Id
75

Id.at 1132.
See id at 1137.
77
See id. at 1135; Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1185 (D. Or. 1998). In the magazine, ALM advertises and sells Bray's "EXECUTE
Murderers, Abortionists" bumper stickers. The magazine has republished the Deadly Dozen
Poster and has featured Michael Griffin, Paul Hill and Shelley Shannon on the cover. When
Shelley Shannon shot Dr. George Tiller, she had, in her possession, copies of the magazine
featuring articles and photos of Dr. Tiller so that she could identify him, his vehicle and his
clinic. ALM endorsed these acts by Shelley Shannon. ALM documents and material were
deleted and destroyed by Associate Director Ramey after the litigation had commenced. One
issue of the magazine noted that Paul Hill was in the process of preparing an "unwanted poster"
of Dr. Britton and described the activities of Hill and others in identifying and surveilling
Dr. Britton. The same issue also commented that the murder of Dr. David Gunn had caused
many more doctors to quit out of fear for their lives and that those who had not quit were
"scared stiff." The magazine also advertised and promoted the White Rose Banquets and other
ACLA events as well as maintaining the hard copy of the Nuremberg Files during the course of
the lawsuit.
76
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magazine reported violence in the anti-abortion movement
acts which were
publicly praised by Life Advocate's editor-in-chief.7 8 ALM also published codefendant Michael Bray's book A Time to Kill7 9 Bray is a minister, now the head
80
of a small congregation that has split off from the mainstream Lutheran Church.
He served forty-six months in federal prison for conspiracy to bomb seven
81
abortion facilities.
A Time to Kill argues that violence against abortion providers is morally and
legally justified. 82 Bray relies on Biblical authority to demonstrate a Christian's
obligation to defend innocent life with force, even killing force. In addition, he
contends that the law recognizes the use of homicide in defense of innocent life
under the doctrine of necessity.83 According to Bray, "[t]here is... a time to
wield the sword and bring death to another for the sake of a third party."'84 He
asks rhetorically, "if Scripture justifies revolution, how much more does it justify
85
the defense of an innocent individual?"
Bray "support[s] the principle of revolution and the goal of establishing a
Christian government." 86 But he does not call for a revolution at this time because
"American Christians are too morally apathetic to carry out such an enterprise at
this time." 87 Instead, he is "simply trying to establish the principle of godly force:
Where baby killing takes place, it is right and good to intervene with force to
prevent such a blasphemous deed." 88
78

See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.

79

Id.at 1137.
80 See 60 Minutes I." The Minister'sBlessing; Michael Bray is a Minister Who is Leading
What He ConsidersHoly WarAgainst Abortion Providers (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 14,
1999) [hereinafter 60 Minutes 11 Broadcast], transcript availabe at LEXIS, CBS News
Transcripts.

81 PlannedParenthood,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
82
A TWTO KILL, supranote 46, at 105.
We think, rather, that if citizens wish to honor their state's true laws above the fiats of renegade
judges, they do a good thing. Regarding the issue at hand, citizens who act on the principles of
their state codes do not violate the law by taking defensive action in behalf of prebom people.
They only violate the will oftryants [sic].
... Laws may be justifiably broken in the course of preventing a harm. The argument has
been admitted occasionally in court regarding blockades of abortuaries. The same argument
which applies to the action of "peaceful" blockading of entrances to childslaughter houses
applies to force against either the facilities or the persons committing the crimes.
Id.

83

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 158.
85
Id. at 160.
86
Id. at 163-64.
84

87
88

Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
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He does hedge on whether he is advocating the murder of doctors. He draws
a distinction between advocating killing, which he disclaims, and failing to
condemn "forceful, even lethal, action which is applied for the purpose of saving
innocent children." 89 As he states, "We remain (pardon the expression) 'prochoice."' 9 0
The district court found that Bray made a variety of statements consistent
with his views articulated in A ime to Kill 1 For example, Bray wrote an article
in Life Advocate in which he stated that he traded his copy of the Army of God
Manual.9 2 Elsewhere, he was quoted as stating that "[a]nyone who truly believes
that the slaughter of children is what we have with abortion could go out and
shoot an abortion provider."9 3 Bray also created a bumper sticker stating
"EXECUTE Murderers" with the word "Abortionists" directly below those
words. He has distributed them at anti-abortion events and through the mail since
94
1992.
Co-defendant Cathy Ramey contributed an essay to A Time to Kill in which
she summarized the argument in defense of Michael Griffin, who murdered
abortionist Dr. David Gunn, and Shelley Shannon, who wounded Dr. George
Tiller, also an abortion provider. She stated what appears to be the position of
members of ACLA: "The actions [of Griffin and Shannon] amounted to nothing
more than providing a defense for innocent people who were going to be killed by

89

Id. at 173-74.

90

Id. at 174.
91 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138-40

(D.
Or.
1999).
92

See Nightline: The Army of God Extremism and Violence Used in the Name of God
(ABC television broadcast, Mar. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Nightline Broadcast],transcript available
at LEXIS, ABC News Transcripts.
[Tihe Army of God. A shadowy group with no known leader, no known headquarters, an army

that may be one person or a thousand, may be organized or a loose network. About all that
appears certain is that the Army of God is willing to kill to prevent abortions. They even have a
manual telling precisely how to do it.
Id. See also James Langton, International:Attacks drive US doctors from abortion; The
American attorney general is set to launch a specialinvestigation amid a climate of violence
and intimidation, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 8, 1998, at 30 ('The Army of God
first emerged in 1982 with the kidnapping of an Illinois doctor and his wife. A threatening letter
sent to the supreme-court judge who wrote the landmark Roe v. Wade judgment, which
legalised abortion in 1973, was also signed by the organization").
93
See Nightline Broadcast,supranote 92.
94
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187
(D. Or. 1998).
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an unjust aggressor."9 5 Their "defensive action" of the innocent, she argues, is
96
justified in light of Biblical text
The district court found that "Ramey has stated that it is a good thing when
abortion providers are shot."9 7 The court quoted her trial testimony that "I think
that there is an element of justice that is undeniable [when an abortion provider is
shot], and whether we recognize that legally or not... there is an element of
justice."9 8

Other co-defendants have expressed similar views to those of Bray and
Ramey. The various co-defendants have participated with and have actively
supported people like Paul Hill, Shelley Shannon, and Michael Griffin, who have
murdered or attempted to murder abortion providers.9 9 For example, codefendant Donald Treshman set up a fund to support accused killer Michael
Griffin after Griffin shot Dr. David Gunn. Prior to Gurn's murder, John Burt
handed out wanted posters to people in Pensacola where Gun worked; 0 0 among
those receiving the poster was Griffin. After Gunn was murdered, Treshman
dispatched a press release, setting up a fund for Griffin's defense. Treshman,
along with Burt, a member of Rescue America, 10 1 was proud that their group had
organized the rally during which Gunn was murdered. Gunn's estate sued Burt
and Treshman, among others, for their role in Griffin's decision to commit
murder.102

95

See A TIME TO KILL, supra note 46, at 184. The article originally appeared in the Life
Advocate magazine published by ALM.
96 Id. at 186-87.
97
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1149
(D. Or. 1999).
98
Id
99

Id.at 1132.

Among those who signed a petition supporting the acquittal of Shannon were defendants ALM,
Bray, Bumett, Dodds and McMillan. Defendant Dawn Stover publicly supported Shannon on
national television. In his October 1993 editorial for Life Advocate, defendant Burnett stated,
"Shelley was a courageous women [sic] that we were very proud to be associated with."
Id. See also id. at 1134 ("Defendants Michael Bray, Andrew Bumett, David Crane, Michael
Dodds, Joseph Foreman, C. Roy McMillan, Catherine Ramey and Dawn Stover signed a
'Defensive Action' petition circulated by Paul Hill declaring the murder of Dr. Gunn justifiable
and calling for Griffin's acquittal."); id. at 1135 ("Defendants Bray, Burnmett, Crane, McMillan,
Ramey and Stover signed a petition calling for the acquittal of Paul Hill. The petition was
identical to that circulated by Hill in support of Michael Griffin.").
100
See id at 1135; Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 5-6.
101 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote51, at 6.
02 Id at 6 n.2 ("[Elvidence in that case demonstrated that Burt had shown Griffin graphic
anti-abortion literature, an aborted fetus in a jar, an effigy of an abortion doctor with a noose
around his neck and a sign stating that 'whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be
shed."').
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Other co-defendants have frequently stated their support of murderers like
Griffin and Hill. For example, co-defendant McMillan called Hill "a patriot," and
a "wonderful man" who "fired the first shots in this war."10 3 The co-defendant
was shot,
protested outside an abortion provider's office shortly after Gun
104
Gunn?"
the
under
feel
you
do
Shah,
"Dr.
holding up a sign reading,
After Canadian abortion provider Garson Romalis was wounded while he sat
in his Vancouver home, co-defendant Treshman praised the shooting on national
television. According to Treshman, the sniper's choice of tactic was "superb"
because shooting the doctor in his home from a distance allowed the sniper to
10 5
escape undetected.
Co-defendant McMillan, who invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence
when asked if he had damaged an abortion clinic, "promotes violence against
abortion providers and abortion clinic workers."1 0 6 According to McMillan,
"those employees choose to work in a place where human beings are being killed.
They choose to enter the killing zone and they need to understand and be warned
that people who choose to kill and be accessories to murder may very well have
violence done against them to stop the violence they are perpetrating on human
beings in the womb. ' 10 7 He predicts that "more violence is inevitable and it is
righteous. It wouldn't bother me if every abortionist in the country today fell dead
from a bullet." I0 8 Like other co-defendants, he believed that killing is justified in
war and that "there is a war in the womb." 10 9
McMillan goes further than most of his co-defendants when he argues that
killing a pregnant abortion provider is justified because "if you have to sacrifice
an innocent to save many, it would be alright [sic]." 110 He also contends that

10 3

PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
104 Id. at 1145.
10 5

Id. at 1135; see also id. at 1145 ("Defendant Treshman organized and sponsored an
event at which defendants Bray and Burnett spoke in favor of the use of force."); id at 1141
("Defendant Burnett himself has been tempted to act violently. He said, 'I would have to say
that anybody who's involved in pro-life activism has been, you know, confronted with that
possibility."). Among other statements supportive of violence on national television and in
other public media are those of co-defendants McMillan and Bray who publicly praised the
bombing of a Birmingham, Alabama clinic. Id. at 1136. The co-defendants also recognize the
danger created by some of the radical anti-abortion activity. One co-defendant admitted that as
a result of the kind of activities that the defendants have engaged in, "I mean, if I was an
abortionist, I would be afraid." He also admitted that he "has been tempted to act violently." Id

at 1141.
10 6

Id. at 1146.
107 Id.

108 Id. at 1147.

109 Id.
10Id.
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killing the President and Supreme Court Justices who support abortion rights is
justified. 111
2. The Defendants' ConductRelatingto Violence
Two acts of violence preceded ACLA's split from Operation Rescue. On
March 10, 1993, Michael Griffin murdered David Gunn, a doctor who performed
abortions in Pensacola, Florida; prior to his death, Gunn was the subject of a
"Wanted" poster that included his name, photograph, and other information to
identify him.1 12 Five months later, Shelley Shannon fired five shots at a Wichita,
Kansas doctor, George Tiller, who also performed abortions. 113 Shannon was "a
close friend and associate of the defendants."'1 14 Those shootings precipitated the
creation of ACLA because its founders argued that the shootings were justified, a
115
position rejected by Operation Rescue.
A second abortion doctor was murdered in 1993. Prior to his murder,
Dr. George Patterson's name, physical description, and address were circulated
on copies of a 'Wanted" poster. 1 6 Also prior to the murders of Dr. John Britton
and his volunteer escort James Barrett and the attempted murder of June Barrett,
James Barrett's wife, Britton's name, photograph, and physical description were
reported on an "unWanted" poster. 117 Those posters used language that later
appeared on posters on the Nuremberg Files and were created by some of the
PlannedParenthooddefendants. Specifically, the unWanted posters stated that
Britton had committed "Crimes Against Humanity ... Britton has brutally
murdered thousands of unborn babies" and included his home and office
addresses, his physical description, a description of his car, including his license
number. 118 At least some of the defendants were aware of the posters and the
I112Id.

Id. at 1139.

113

A TlME TOKILL, supranote 46, at 183-84.

11

4 Planned Parenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 ("Shannon also later pleaded guilty to
arson and butyric acid attacks on eight abortion facilities, including Portland Feminist's Eugene
Oregon Clinic.").
115

Id. at 1136.

116 Id.at 1134.
117

Id. at 1135.

8

11 Id.; see also Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 51, at 7-8.
As reported in detail in the September 1993 issue of Life Advocate, Hill, Burt, Gratton and
Murray cased the clinic, waiting for an opportunity to snap Dr. Britton's picture. Hill had a
camera and managed to get a picture of the doctor, but his name was still unknown. Later in the
evening, Murray got Dr. Britton's license plate number which he quickly phoned in to another
Burt associate who ran the license plate number to reveal Dr. Britton's identity. The Life
Advocate article published by defendants concluded as follows: "John Burt is currently working
on an unwanted poster 'exposing this man for the butcher that he is,' and making vital
information about him available to the public."

20001
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possibility that the posters contributed to violence against abortion providers. For
example, Bray reported favorably on Burt's efforts to circulate the Britton poster
19
in Bray's magazine.
Those crimes inspired further activity by ACLA. Prior to the murders, codefendants Catherine Ramey and Andrew Burnett visited John Burt, creator of the
Dr. Gunn poster and co-creator of the Dr. Britton poster. He prepared the Britton
poster with Britton's murderer, Paul Hill. As found by the district court in
PlannedParenthood,Ramey, Burnett, Hill and Burt "discussed 'wanted' posters
20
at this meeting."'
After Ramey and Burnett's visit to Florida and after the murders of Gunm and
Britton, several co-defendants in PlannedParenthoodhelped create a document
called the "Deadly Dozen" poster, 12 1 modeled on the "Wanted" posters. While
the poster was in the planning stages, John Salvi murdered two people and
wounded five others, all of whom worked in abortion clinics in Brookline,
Massachusetts. 122 Salvi drove immediately to Norfolk, Virginia, where codefendant Crane lived.1 23 Salvi fired gunshots into a clinic there where Crane had
often protested. 124 A month earlier, Crane was quoted in Life Advocate about his
belief that the prior murders had led to the decision of a number of abortion
doctors to quit. 125 The article also identified the Hillcrest Clinic. 126 Crane later
speculated that Salvi was drawn to Norfolk by publications like the Life

Burt, Gratton and Murray then traveled across the state to Femandina Beach, where
Dr. Britton lived, and took pictures of his house and the building in which his private practice
was located. With the information they obtained through Dr. Britton's license plate number and
the photographs, they prepared a poster that read across the top, "umWANTED John Bayard
Britton."

Id. (citations omitted).

119 See Plaintiff s Memorandum, supra note 51, at 8-9.
... Bumett testified that he could "neither affirm or deny" that he knew at least as of September
1994 that there were posters for Dr. Gunn and Dr. Britton prior to their deaths. Defendants
McMillan and Mears candidly admitted having knowledge of this fact. Most claimed not to
recall the precise sequence of events.

Id (citations omitted).
120 PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 ("Hill and Burt were videotaped taking
photographs for the poster of Dr. Britton!").

121 Id. at 1153 ("[E]ach defendant, acting independently and as a co-conspirator, prepared,
published and disseminated the Deadly Dozen poster.").
122 Id. at 1135-36.
123 Plaintiffs Memorandum,supranote 51, at 21.
124
PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
125 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 21.
126 Id.
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Advocate.127 The possibility that the campaign in support of violence against
abortion providers was inspiring people like Salvi did not deter ACLA from its
128
decision to publish its poster.
ACLA first published the Deadly Dozen poster on January 22, 1995, in the
Washington, D.C. area. 129 Co-defendants republished it in various settings
127

See id at 21-22 ("Salvi was apprehended and arrested in Norfolk and held in the local

jail for several days. Crane and his associate Donald Spitz-whose name and phone number
reportedly were in Salvi's possession at the time of his arrest-attended a vigil at the jail in
support of Salvi.").
128
See id ('The planning occurred at a meeting of the ACLA leadership held in Bowie,
Maryland at Bray's parents' home, and through a series of conference calls among many of the
defendants in the late fall of 1994. Bray, Bumett, Crane, Dodds, Miller, Foreman and Murch
attended the Maryland meeting."); see also id at 25.
David Lane had attended the January 1995 events where he "got in with the ACLA group." He
returned from the ACLA event with a copy of Michael Bray's book, A Time to Kill, and in short
order attacked a Planned Parenthood clinic. Lane received a 15-year prison sentence for the
clinic attack.

Id.

129

See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 ('The Deadly Dozen poster... is a
true threat to bodily harm, assault, or kill one or more of the plaintiffs ....
The Deadly Dozen
poster was created by the American Coalition of Life Activists ('ACLA') and first published in
or around Washington, D.C. on January 22, 1995."); id. at 1138 ('Defendant Bray attended the
ACLA planning meeting in Bowie, Maryland in November 1994.); idat 1141-42.
Defendant Bumett attended the ACLA planning meeting where the Deadly Dozen poster was
discussed, in Bowie, Maryland in November 1994.... Defendant Bumett participated in an
ACLA conference call prior to the January 1995 meeting, to plan the Deadly Dozen
poster.... Defendant Bumett provided the names and addresses of Drs. Elizabeth and James
Newhall and Dr. George Kabacy for the Deadly Dozen poster and helped prepare the
poster .... Defendant Bumett also asked Paul deParrie to provide names for the list
.Defendant Crane attended the ACLA organizational meeting in Bowie, Maryland in
November 1994, to plan the January 1995 event ...Defendant Crane participated in the ACLA
conference call to plan the Deadly Dozen poster....
Defendant Crane prepared the Deadly
Dozen poster and solicited names and other information for the poster from other
defendants.... Defendant Crane unveiled the Deadly Dozen poster at the ACLA event in
January 1995 in blown-up form. ...
Defendant Crane and ACLA republished the Deadly
Dozen poster on several occasions after learning that the physicians on the list had been
provided U.S. Marshal protection after the poster was published.
Id. (citations and some paragraph structure omitted). Id at 1143 ("Defendant Dodds attended
the ACLA meeting in Bowie, Maryland in November 1994, to plan the January 1995
event ....
Defendant Dodds participated in the ACLA conference call to plan the Deadly Dozen
poster ...Defendant Dodds provided Dr. George Tiller's name for the Deadly Dozen
poster."); id. at 1144 ('Defendant Dreste approved of the Deadly Dozen poster. Dreste regretted
that Dr. Robert Crist was not one of the doctors named on the poster."); id at 1145 ("Defendant
Forman attended the ACLA organizational meeting in Bowie, Maryland in November 1994.");
id. at 1146 ("Defendant McMillan provided the name of Dr. Joseph Booker to David Crane for
the Deadly Dozen poster."); idat 1147 ("Defendant Murch provided the names and addresses
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thereafter130 The document resembled the 'Wanted" posters in important
essentials.
The poster listed the names of thirteen abortion providers and included the
addresses for some of the physicians.1 3 1 The poster listed Dr. Tiller's name and
address. He had been shot over a year earlier. 132 Some of the information listed in
133
the poster had been published earlier by Life Advocate, ALM's magazine.
Tiller's assailant Shelley Shannon, who had participated in protests of Tiller's
clinic along with two co-defendants in PlannedParenthoodand a close friend of
the defendants, had copies of Life Advocate with information about Tiller when
she shot him.' 3 4 Not only was Shannon a friend of a number of the defendants,
but she corresponded with Bray and admitted that she was inspired to commit
violent acts by A Time to Kill.135 After the shooting, Bray stated that Shannon had
shown "excessive restrainf' when she wounded Tiller and invoked the Fifth
Amendment when he was asked whether he knew of her plan to shoot Tiller in
13 6
advance of the act.
of the two doctors from the Northeast region for the Deadly Dozen poster ... Defendant
Murch republished the Deadly Dozen poster in his newsletter Salt & Light after being made
aware that physicians on this poster had been provided U.S. Marshal protection. He circulated
his newsletter with the Deadly Dozen poster to 700 people."); id. at 1149 ("Defendant Stover
attended the ACLA planning meeting in Bowie, Maryland in November 1994."); id at 1150
('Defendant Treshman provided the name of Dr. Douglas Karpen for the Deadly Dozen
poster.'); id. at 1151 ("Defendant Wysong provided defendant Crane with names of physicians
for the Deadly Dozen poster."); id at 1152 ("DeParrie, at defendant Burnett's request, provided
names of doctors for the Deadly Dozen poster.").
130 Id. at 1132 ("Defendant Advocates for Life Ministries ('ALM') republished the poster
in its magazine Life Advocate. Defendant Murch republished the poster in his publication, Salt
& Light. Defendants also republished the poster at later ACLA events.").
131 Id
132 Id
133

See idj at 1132, 1137-38.
Id. See also Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 51, at 14 ("In the meanwhile, a
housewife from Grants Pass, Oregon, Rachelle 'Shelley' Shannon--who had worked with
Portland-based defendants ALM, Bumett, Ramey and Stover and corresponded with defendant
Bray-had embarked on a spree of clinic bombings, arsons and butyric acid attacks against ten
West Coast clinics.").
135 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 13-14.
136 See id at 14 &n.6.
134

After Shannon's arrest, investigators also found an anonymous booklet buried in her
backyard called the "Army of God Manual"-a users instruction booklet on bombing, burning
and vandalizing abortion clinics, and on injuring and maiming abortion providers. They also
found Bray's book. Defendants have possessed or at least seen this "how-to" manual.
Id. at 14 n.6. See also Nightline Broadcast,supra note 92 (explaining that Michael Bray was
behind a series often clinic bombings, and a sign reading A.O.G. was found in front of one of
those clinics).
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The Deadly Dozen poster's heading stated "GUILTY of Crimes Against
Humanity," and mentioned the 1945-46 Nuremberg trials. After listing the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers ofthe twelve doctors, the poster offered
a five thousand dollar reward for "information leading to arrest, conviction and
revocation of license to practice medicine" of those named. 137 ACLA republished
the Deadly Dozen poster for several months, including the poster in its
1 39
mailings. 13 8 ALM republished the poster in its magazine in 1995 as well.
In August, 1995, ACLA released additional posters, each naming one doctor
or reproductive health care clinic. 140 The information included was similar to that
found in the Deadly Dozen poster. For example, the poster identifying co-plaintiff
Dr. Crist included large type accusing him of being "GUILTY OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY."' 14 1 The poster included his home and work addresses.
Below his photograph, the poster stated that Crist was a "notorious Kansas City
abortionist [who] travels to St Louis weekly to kill babies at Reproductive Health
Services.... He also sometimes kills women." 14 2 The poster requested that
people contact him to persuade him to give up performing abortions. The poster
contained the words "$500 REWARD" and "ABORTIONIST" in large print,
followed by ACLA's name and address.1 43 Law enforcement also took the Crist
poster seriously. 144
Subsequently, ACLA members produced six "Guilty" posters, targeting three
doctors and three reproductive health care clinics in August 1995. The posters
targeted St. Louis area abortion providers and were issued during an ACLA
137 Planned

Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186

(D.Or. 1998).
138 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137
(D. Or. 1999).
139 Id. ("ALM republished the Deadly Dozen poster in the March 1995 issue of Life

Advocate"). Law enforcement took the Deadly Dozen poster seriously. An F.B.I.
representative warned the doctors whose names appeared on the poster that they needed to take

safety precautions. The F.B.I. also offered 24 hour a day protection for the doctors and their
families. Other law enforcement agencies also contacted the doctors. Obviously, law

enforcement officials believed that the poster would incite violence. Id. at 1132.
140 PlannedParenthood,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
141 Id. at 1187.
14

2Id.

143 Ird.

144 See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133
(D. Or. 1999); see also Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 51, at 30.
[Crist] was particularly frightened by the poster in light of the fact that two ACLA leaders who
had harassed him for years, Dreste and Treshman, were behind the poster campaign. While
speaking at the event, Dreste threatened that he would do whatever is necessaryto stop Dr. Crist
from performing abortions.
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conference held in St Louis. The posters were similar to the Deadly Dozen poster
and included a caption "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY," with a line across
the bottom indicating that the target of the poster was an "ABORTIONIST" or an
"ABORTUARY."'1 4 5 The posters listed the doctors' work and home addresses
and photographs (or in one case, a sketch) of the featured doctor or clinic. The
146
posters included additional inflammatory language.
The Nuremberg Files grew out of these earlier activities. Co-defendants
David Crane and Andrew Burnett organized the project with Paul deParrie. 147
The files were unveiled at a January 1996 ACLA meeting and were approved by
several of the co-defendants. 14 8 When first presented, the files consisted of a box
filled with personal information about abortion doctors. 149 Later, deParrie gave
Horsely twenty-two files that Horsely posted as a sub-site on his Christian Gallery
website1 50
Like the Deadly Dozen and Crist poster, the Nuremberg Files post-date the
murders of a number of abortion doctors. As found by the district court, the codefendants knew about the murders of the various doctors and the appearance of
their names on Wanted posters when they published their various posters and
when they began the Nuremberg Files. 151 According to the district court, the
defendants "Released Their Threats into a Known Atmosphere of Violence
Against Abortion Providers. ' 152 Not only did ALM chronicle the continuing
violence against abortion providers in its magazine, 153 but various co-defendants
were present at abortion clinics around the time that violence took place there.
Furthermore, they made frequent, highly publicized statements supportive of
154
those who committed violent acts.
145 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 29.
14 6

Id. at 30.

47

1 See id at31.
148 Id. at32.
149 Id.
150 Id. at33.

151 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134
(D). Or. 1999) ("By January 1995, defendants knew of the murder of Dr. David Gunn and of the
posters that preceded his death."); id. ("Defendant knew of the murder of Dr. Patterson and the
poster that preceded it."); id at 1135 ("By January 1995, defendants were aware of the murder
of Dr. Britton and the posters that preceded it."); id. ("By January 1995, defendants were aware
of the shooting [of Dr. Romalis] as well.").
152 Id. at 1134.
153
Id. at 1135.
15 4 See id, at 1135-36.
In August 1993, just two days prior to the murder of Dr. Patterson, Dr. George Tiller was
shot in both arms by Shelley Shannon. Shelley Shannon was a close friend and associate of the
defendants. Shannon also later pleaded guilty to arson and butyric acid attacks on eight abortion
facilities, including Portland Feminist's Eugene, Oregon clinic.
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E. The Death Toll

Most of the murders of abortion doctors and security personnel preceded
ACLA's activity that formed the basis of the Planned Parenthoodlitigation.
Nonetheless, all of those killed or wounded since March 10, 1993, were listed on
the Nuremberg Files with their names crossed out if killed, or marked in gray, if
wounded. That list included doctors David Gunn (killed March 10, 1993), George
Tiller (wounded August 19, 1993), George Patterson (killed August 21, 1993),155

John Britton (killed July 1994), Garson Romalis (wounded November 1994),
Hugh Short (wounded November 10, 1995), and Jack Fainman (wounded
November 11, 1997); it also includes several clinic employees, a police officer,
and volunteer security personnel: James Barrett (killed July 29, 1994), June
Barrett (wounded July 29, 1994), Shannon Lowney and Leann Nicols (killed
December 30, 1994), Anjana Angrawal, Jayne Sauer, Richard J. Seron, Antonio

In November 1994, in Vancouver, Canada, Dr. Garson Romalis, an abortion provider, was
shot by a sniper with a high-powered rifle at close range. He was having breakfast in his home

at the time.
By January 1995, plaintiffs were aware of the sniper shooting of Dr. Romalis.
By January 1995, defendants were aware of the shooting as well. Defendant Treshman
praised the shooting of Dr. Romalis on national television, stating, "I would say that that was
certainly the superb tactic. It was certainly far better than anything that was seen in the States
because the shooting was done in such a way that the perpetrator got away. I would think more
abortionists should quit as a result of it."
Soon thereafter, on December 30, 1994, John Salvi murdered two clinic workers and
wounded five others at two clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts. One of the clinics in Brookline
was a Planned Parenthood clinic.
Immediately following the shootings in Massachusetts, Salvi drove to Norfolk, Virginia
and fired shots into the windows of the Hillcrest Clinic inNorfolk
Defendant David Crane was present outside of the Hillcrest Clinic on the morning John
Salvi fired the shots.
Defendant Michael Bray had been convicted and served four years in federal prison for
conspiracy to bomb seven abortion facilities including the Hillcrest Clinic.
More physicians who perform abortions in Canada have been shot by snipers since the
sniper shooting of Dr.Romalis.
In January 1998, a bomb in Birmingham, Alabama killed an off-duty police officer and
maimed a nurse who worked at the clinic.
Defendant McMillan referred to the Birmingham bombing as "a righteous act." Defendant
Bray likewise defended this violence on national television.
In October 1998, in his home outside of Buffalo, New York, Dr. Barnett Slepian, a doctor
who performed abortions, was shot and killed by a sniper.
Dr. Slepian's name is crossed out on the Nuremberg Files website.
Violence against abortion providers has continued through today.
Id. (citations and paragraph numbering omitted).
155 On the Internet Freedom version of the website, there was no listing of Dr. George
Patterson, but there was a Wayne Patterson with a question mark next to the state and a line
through the name. NurembergFiles,supranote 6.

2000]

NUREMBURG FILES

1199

Hernandez and Brian Murray (wounded December 30, 1994), Robert Sanderson
(killed January 29, 1998), and Emily Lyons (wounded January 29, 1998).156
One doctor of special interest, Dr. Barnett Slepian, an abortion provider in
upstate New York, was murdered on October 23, 1998. Prior to his death, his
name was listed on the Nuremberg Files. 157 Horsley crossed out Slepian's name
on the Nuremberg Files within hours of his murder.1 58 In June 1999, a New York
grand jury indicted James Kopp, an anti-abortion activist with ties to the
159
defendants, for this murder.
U-I[. FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW

A criminal defendant exhorts an associate to commit a crime and provides the
associate with information to help locate his victim. No criminal defense lawyer
in the United States would urge that the defendant's speech-and indeed in the
hypothetical, the defendant has engaged in nothing but speech-is entitled to First
Amendment protection. Arguably, at least some of the Planned Parenthood
defendants did just that. In the Nuremberg Files and elsewhere, their rhetoric has
encouraged violence against abortion providers, and the personal information in
the Files and on the unWanted posters may provide actual aid to would-be
assassins. Despite that, First Amendment advocates have asserted that the
defendants are entitled to speech protection.
Concern about sanctioning the PlannedParenthooddefendants is legitimate.
The Planned Parenthooddefendants' message is certainly unpopular. Not only
do they challenge the legality and morality of abortion, an opinion not shared by a
majority of Americans, 160 but they also advocate violence, in contravention of the

156 Id.
157

See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136 ("Dr. Slepian's name is crossed out
on the Nuremberg Files website.").
15

8See Viele, Newspaper Article, supra note 19 ('Horsley says someone notified him of

the shooting, an event quickly confirmed by TV reports, he says. Only after seeing reports on
TV did he strike through Slepian's name, he says").
159 Shirley E. Perlman, Indictmentin S7epian Slaying; FBIconcedes anti-abortionactivist
at large, NEWsDAY, June 25, 1999, at A24; see also Roughly 300 protesters demonstrated
loudly but peacefully Wednesday.. ..

,

LErBRIDGE HERALD, Apr. 8, 1999, at 6., availableat

1999 WL 14898252.
Joan Andrews Bell, [a speaker at Human Life International conference, a U.S. based
organization that promotes chastity, family life and the rights of the unborn], has a lengthy
criminal record in the U.S., including burglary, related to protests at abortion clinics. Bell is also
reportedly a colleague ofJames Kopp.

1d Additionally, co-defendant Treshman, is "HLI's spokesman.'
160
THE GALLP POLL MONTLY, Aug. 1996, at 33; THE GALLUP POLL, Aug. 28, 1980, at
171 (Survey 159-G); May 31, 1981, at 112 (Survey 173-G);July 31, 1983, at 142

1200

OHIOSTATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1175

law of every state in the country,16 1 based on questionable Biblical and moral
teaching.' 62 But that is the very kind of case in which courts must exercise careful
scrutiny to be sure that First Amendment values are upheld. 163 At the same time,
the defendants' message also represents a threat to human life, and as such, may
164
not be entitled to First Amendment protection.
At trial, the defendants attempted to bring their case within the protection of
the First Amendment. 165 In response to the defendants' motion for summary

'16 6
The
judgment the plaintiffs argued that the case involved "true threats.
167
district court agreed with the plaintiffs.
However, whether their conduct
actually amounted to true threats is currently before the Ninth Circuit' 168 and has
169
already been the subject of scholarly attention.

(Survey 217-G); see also Michael Vitiello, How Imperialis the Supreme Court?An Analysis of
Supreme CourtAbortion DoctrineandPopularWill, 34 U.S.F.L. REV. 49 (1999).
161 The claim that necessity justifies killing abortion providers finds no support in the law.
While the Model Penal Code would allow killing under the general necessity provision, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1974), states have not allowed necessity as a defense to homicide. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 22.02 (2d ed. 1995). Even under the Model
Penal Code, the defense would be unavailable if allowing the defense would be contrary to
legislative intent. Id. at § 22.05; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(C) (1974) ("Conduct
that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
justifiable, provided that: ... a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear."). That a state would allow the murder of an abortion provider for
conduct that is lawful is sheer fantasy.
162 See 60 MinutesIlBroadcast,supranote 80 ("Rev. Dowhower: What worries me most
is that the word of God is misrepresented, that God is portrayed as this vengeful moral
absolutist who has made the eradication of abortion the all-important issue. The all-important
issue is God's love, not his vengeance.").
163 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 n.5 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("You really believe in freedom of speech, if you are willing to allow it to men whose opinions
seem to you wrong and even dangerous.").
164
See infra Part IV.
165 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189
(D. Or. 1998).
166 Plaintiffs Memorandum, supranote 51, at 57-59.
167
See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1372
(D. Or. 1998).
168 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130
(D. Or. 1999), appeal docketed, No. 99-35405 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 1999). See also Howard
Mintz, Anti-Abortion Website likely protected under First Amendment, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Sept 13,2000, availableat LEXIS, News Library, San Jose Mercury News.
169
See generally Noffsinger, supra note 38 (discussing the PlannedParenthooddecision
and proposing a "synthesized test under which juries first would apply a four-part definition to
distinguish threats from political advocacy, and second determine whether the speech poses a
likelihood of imminent violence"); see also Gey, supra note 38; Richards, supra note 38, at
292-93.
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Because the case came within the Watts line of cases, the court did not have
to address a different issue, whether the threatened harm to abortion providers
was sufficiently imminent to allow the speech to be sanctioned.1 70 As argued by
the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
Brandenburgapplies in cases in which a speaker encourages a third party to
engage in lawless conduct, while Watts applies when a defendant directs a threat
17 1
towards another person.
Much of the debate in PlannedParenthoodturns on whether the trial court's
72
use of an objective standard, rather than a subjective standard, was appropriate.
That debate is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article addresses the
question that the district court did not have to answer. whether, even if the
defendants' conduct did not amount to true threats, they nonetheless could be
punished for incitement to violence. Whether such a prosecution would violate
the First Amendment turns on the proper interpretation of Brandenburgv. Ohio
and its progeny. 173 To understand that line of cases, this section begins with
earlier case law applying the Court's clear and present danger test and the
Holmes-Brandeis dissenting opinions. 174 Although not without debate,
Brandenburg vindicated their earlier position; 75 therefore, the dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis may shed light on the correct application of the Court's
current approach to the issue. Thereafter, this section reviews Brandenburgand
the limited case law applying its test.1 76 This section also reviews Learned Hand's
opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten1 77 because as demonstrated by

The messages on the Nuremberg files site contained no explicit threat of, or direct incitement to,
violence, raising the question of whether new remedies were indeed construed by the jury in its
application of this law. Ifno explicit threat was made against abortion doctors on the web page,
the question becomes why did the jury reach its conclusion and award such a massive amount
of damages?
The magnitude of the verdict arguably reflects the jury's discomfort with or perhaps
apprehension of the internet as a communications medium.

Id.
170 Richards, supranote 38, at 293.
171

Plaintiff s Memorandum, supranote 51, at 57-58.

172

Viele, Newspaper Article, supranote 19.
173 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
174 See infra Part lI.A.
17 5
LAURENCE H. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTTMUTONAL

(1978); Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
LAW 616

History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754 (1975); David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the
ClearandPresentDangerTest, 73 IND. LJ. 1217, 1233-34.

176 See infra Part lI.C-D.

177 244 F. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1917), rev'd,246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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Professor Gunther, Hand's opinion was the other major influence on the Supreme
17 8
Court's modem incitement cases.
A. The EarlyPrecedent
The Supreme Court's early cases relating to political dissent almost
uniformly upheld, upon a minimal showing, the federal and state governments'
179
authority to prosecute speech advocating unpopular causes.
In Schenck v. United States, 80 the defendants mailed pamphlets to draftees
during wartime. The circulars argued in "impassioned language" that the draft
was unconstitutional and that the draftees should "assert [their] rights" to resist
conscription. 181 The government prosecuted the defendants under the Espionage
Act of 1917, which made criminal an attempt to obstruct the draft or cause
182
insubordination in the military.
The government contended that the pamphlets alone amounted to an
attempted crime, even absent a showing of actual interference with the war
184
effort. 183 A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the defendants' convictions.
Justice Holmes framed the issue as "whether the words used are used in
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.' '185
The Court left for the jury the job of determining whether the evidence was
sufficient to show a clear and present danger that the circulars could have the
1 86
natural effect of persuading draftees to resist conscription.'
A second example further demonstrates that the clear and present danger test
as then conceived by the Court offered little constitutional protection. Perhaps the
most starting case to those who grew up in the Vietnam Era when anti-war
1 87
dissent was open, frequent, and raucous, is Debs v. United States. The
Supreme Court affirmed Debs' conviction for what amounted to an antiwar
speech against a challenge that the evidence was insufficient.1 88 The Court upheld

178 Gunther, supranote 175, at 722.

179 See infra Part IHA-B.
180 249 U.S.47 (1919).
181 Id. at 51.

182 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Sta. 217,219 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1994)).
183
Schench, 249 U.S. at 49.
18 4

1Id. at53.

185

Id. at 52.

186 Id .

187 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
18 8

Id. at 213-14.
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the jury's determination that the "natural and intended effect" of Debs' speech
189
was to frustrate the war effort.
Holmes, during the 1920 Court Term, for the first time, joined by Brandeis,
began to dissent from the Court's restrictive view of the First Amendment. In
Abrams v. United States,1 90 five Bolshevik sympathizers dropped leaflets onto the
streets of New York. The leaflets opposed the United States' support of antiSoviet forces in the Russian revolution and called for a strike to prevent
19 1
shipments of weapons to those forces.
The Supreme Court affirmed the five defendants' convictions under the
Espionage Act, which was amended in 1918 to make it an offense to urge
192
curtailment of military production with intent to hinder the war with Germany.
The Court overcame the obvious problem, that the defendants' intent was not to
hinder the war effort against the Germans, by imputing knowledge to the
defendants that strikes preventing war production would necessarily harm the war
193
effort against the Germans.
The speaker began by saying that he had just returned from a visit to the workhouse in the
neighborhood where three of their most loyal comrades were paying the penalty for their
devotion to the woridng class .... He said that he had to be prudent and might not be able to say
all that he thought... but he did say that those persons were paying the penalty for standing
erect and for seeking to pave the way to better conditions for all mankind. Later he added further
eulogies and said that he was proud of them. He then expressed opposition to Prussian
militarism in a way that naturally might have been thought to be intended to include the mode of
proceeding in the United States.
... [H]e took up the case of Kate Richards O'Hare, convicted of obstructing the enlistment
service, praised her for her loyalty to Socialism and otherwise, and said that she was convicted
on false testimony, under a ruling that would seem incredible to him if he had not had some
experience with a Federal Court. ... The defendant spoke of other cases, and then, after dealing
with Russia, said that the master class has always declared the war and the subject class has
always fought the battles-that the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose,
including their lives; that the working class, who furnish the corpses, have never yet had a voice
in declaring peace. "You have your lives to lose; you certainly ought to have the right to declare
war if you consider a war necessary." The defendant next mentioned Rose Pastor Stokes,
convicted of attempting to cause insubordination and refusal ofduty in the military forces of the
United States and obstructing the recruiting service. He said that she went out to render her
service to the cause in this day of crises, and they sent her to the penitentiary for ten years; that
she had said no more than the speaker had said that afternoon; that if she was guilty so was he,
and that he would not be cowardly enough to plead his innocence; but that her message that
opened the eyes of the people must be suppressed, and so after a mock trial before a packed jury
and a corporation tool on the bench, she was sent to the penitentiary for ten years.

Id.
189 Id. at 215.
190 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
191 Id. at 620-23.
192
Id. at 624; Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (as amended
by Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75,40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1948).
193 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621-22.
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Holmes, the author of Schenck's clear and present danger test, sought to
vitalize the test, perhaps for the first time with the intent to make the test
protective of the First Amendment values. 194 His dissent argued that the First
Amendment prevented Congress from forbidding "all efforts to change the mind
of the country."' 195 As a result, he urged that the First Amendment required the
government to show a specific intent to cause a harm that Congress has the power
to prevent. Holmes read the statute as comporting with the specific intent
requirement, but also found the evidence of the defendants' intent insufficient to
196
support their conviction.
Holmes also argued that the evidence was insufficient because, even if the
leaflets were treated as an attempt to obstruct the war effort, the danger of the
feared obstruction was not sufficiently clear and present.' 97 That is quite similar
to the criminal law of attempt,198 where a court must recognize a line between
mere intent to commit harm accompanied by an innocent act, and intent plus a
sufficient act demonstrating actual harm. Here, the feared obstruction was not
sufficiently imminent.199
While commentators have focused on the ambiguity in Holmes' dissent,200
Abrams is best understood when it is viewed along with other dissenting or
concurring opinions by Holmes and Brandeis. For example, in Whitney v.
California, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Anna Whitney for
participating in a meeting of the Communist Labor Party Convention.2 01 The
party declared itself to be in "full harmony with 'the revolutionary worldng class
194 The extent to which Holmes had a change of philosophy has been the subject of much

debate. E.g., G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech
Jurisprudence:The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391 (1992); David M. Rabban, The
Emergence ofModern FirstAmendment Doctine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983); David S.
Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HoFsrRA L. REv. 97
(1982).

195

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Dow & Shieldes, supra note 175, at
1227 (arguing that although Holmes claimed in Abrams to be using the clear and present danger
test, he actually "tightened it:"). As noted by Dow & Shieldes,
196

As he [Holmes] put it: I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would

justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish speech
that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States may constitutionally seek to prevent.
Id.

197

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198 DRESSLER, supra note 161, § 27.
199
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
200
TRIBE, supra note 175, at 611; White, supra note 194, at 433-42; Dow & Shieldes,
supra note 175, at 1229-30; Gunther, supra note 175, at 742-43.

201 Whitney v. Califomia, 274 U.S. 357,372 (1927).
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parties of all countries.' and had as its purpose "to create a unified revolutionary
working class movement in America."2 02 After the party adopted its resolution,
Whitney, "without, so far as it appears, making any protest, remained in the
convention until it adjourned."2 03 Despite her continued attendance, she denied
that she intended the party to "be an instrument of terrorism or violence."20 4 She
was convicted of criminal anarchy and criminal syndicalism. 2 05
Most troubling to Brandeis and Holmes was the fact that the syndicalism
statute made advocacy a crime.2 0 6 Under the California statute, the prosecutor did
not have to demonstrate that the result advocated (the overthrow of the capitalist
system, for example) was imminent, that is, that it was a clear and present
danger. 207 The Court deferred to the legislative determination, in enacting the
statute, that danger inhered in advocacy.20 8 In effect, the syndicalism act, as
applied, was a rational exercise of state police powers. 20 9
In Whitney, Brandeis concurred on jurisdictional grounds, but most of his
lengthy opinion set out his disagreement with the Court's approach to the First
Amendment question.2 10 He disagreed that the Court should defer to the
legislature's determination of a clear and present danger 2 11 After cataloguing the
values underlying free speech, Brandeis concluded that "[b]elieving in the power
of reason as applied through public discussion, [the framers] eschewed silence
coerced by law."2 12 While the state may suppress speech that represents serious
injury, fear of injury is alone insufficient to justify suppression of speech. Before
the state may suppress speech, it must have a reasonable fear of imminent and
2 13
serious harm
Brandeis recognized that "[e]very denunciation of existing law."2 14 increases
the probability that it will be violated. But without imminent harm, speech is
protected by the First Amendment.2 15 That is so because "no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is an opportunity for
2 02

Id.at 363.

203 Id.at 366.
204 Id.
205 Id.at 359-60.
206
See id at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
20
7 Id at 371-72.

208 Id.
209 I.
2 10

Id at 372 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).

211 Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
2 12
2 13

Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).

214 Id
215 Id
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full discussion."2 16 Here, Brandeis offered his version of the market place of ideas
concept introduced by Holmes in Abrams: if the harm is not imminent the
217
solution is education and the remedy is more speech, "not enforced silence."
Brandeis and Holmes articulated a number of important principles in the
*advocacy-incitement cases. As a matter of substantive rules, the danger that the
legislature is authorized to address must be clear and present. That meant that the
harm must be imminent. The speaker must also intend to incite the harm. Those
rules flow from the purpose of the First Amendment to protect political dissent
2 18
and unpopular speech from suppression by the majority.
Two procedural principles emerged as well. First a legislative determination
of a clear and present danger is not binding on the court.21 9 A court must
determine on its own whether the evidence supports the existence of imminent
harm. Second, a court has a greater than normal role in reviewing a jury's
determination that harm is sufficiently imminent and that a defendant has a
specific intent to bring about the harm. Protection of the First Amendment creates
220
the obligation of independent review ofthe record.
One other early decision, Learned Hand's opinion in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten,22 1 is important for understanding the evolution of
modem First Amendment case law. There, the plaintiff, publisher of a
revolutionary journal, applied for an injunction, in effect to compel the postmaster
to accept its journal for mailing.2 22 The postmaster refused to accept the
publication because, in his view, the magazine violated the Espionage Act of
1917223 Hand did not hold that the act violated the First Amendment. Instead, in
construing the statute as inapplicable to The Masses, he read the statute to avoid a
conflict with the First Amendment.224
The postmaster argued that the content of The Masses, for example, political
cartoons and text expressing the sympathy for conscientious objectors, violated
the provision of the act making unlawful "causing insubordination, disloyalty,
2 16

Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

217 Id.
2 18

Id.
219 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
220

During the period between the end of the red scare after the Bolshevik revolution and

the beginning of the Cold War, the Court decided a series of cases that gave more bite to the

clear and present danger test. See Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion
Protestors: The Consequences of Falling Into the TheoreticalAbyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1, 12
(1998). In perhaps its strongest articulation of the test, the Court stated that "the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can
be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,263 (1941).

221 244 F. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1917), rev'd 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
222 Id at 536.

223 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30,40 Stat. 217.
224
Masses Publ'gCo., 244 F. at 535.
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mutiny or refusal of duty in the militaiy."225 The postmaster argued that the
magazine aroused discontent with the war and that once the reader became
discontented with the war, he would then be more likely to become insubordinate
to his superiors.2 26 Hand refused to read "cause" so broadly because to do so
2 27
would lead to suppression of all criticism of existing policies.
In rejecting the postmaster's position, Hand attempted to draw a line between
22 8
permissible speech and illegal incitement, a line that would resurface later.
Hand stated that "[o]ne may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it
stands." 229 That is so because:
[w]ords are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those
which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of
interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government
in a democratic state.2 30
Hand would thus create a per se category of unprotected speech.
For Hand, the line between protected and unprotected speech should be
objectively determined from the content of a speech, unlike the line drawn by
Holmes and Brandeis which varied depending on the effect that the speech would
have.2 31 Hence, according to Hand, a speech critical of the war effort, without
counseling draft resistance, could not be criminalized even if the listeners were
motivated to resist the draft. Political agitation must be distinguished from "direct
' 2 32
incitement to violent resistance.
Hand's approach was both more and less protective of speech than the
Holmes-Brandeis approach. Hand would leave unprotected the ineffectual
speaker who implausibly urged his audience to violate the law.233 But he would
also extend protection to a speaker who intended his words to incite the audience
2 34
but avoided express inciternent.

2 25

Id at 539.
226 Id
22 7

Jd at 539-40.

22 8

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Masses Publ'g Co., 244 F. at 540.

22 9

230 Id
231 Gunther, supranote 175, at 720-21.
232

Masses Publ'gCo., 244 F. at 540.
233 Gunther, supranote 175, at 729.
234 Id
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B. The Smith Act Cases
Passed in 1940, the Smith Act,235 like the state anarchy and syndicalism
laws, targeted left wing activism.236 It made unlawful advocating the overthrow
of any government in the United States by the use of violence, as well as the
publishing of written material advocating or organizing any group which teaches,
advocates, or encourages the overthrow of any government in the United States
by violence. 237 During the height of the post-World War II fear of international
238
communist domination, prosecutors made frequent use of the Smith Act.
In Dennis v. United States, eleven defendants, members of the National
Board of the Communist Party, were convicted ofviolating the Smith Act.239 The
evidence showed that in the course of organizing the Communist Party, the
defendants did little more than distribute pamphlets and organize classes to teach
communist doctrine.2 40 The plurality opinion recognized that the HolmesBrandeis view had gained acceptance in subsequent cases.241 But according to
Chief Justice Vinson, Holmes and Brandeis did not write their dissents
"confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one-the development
of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the Government, in
the context of world crisis after crisis." 242 Instead of accepting their own clear and
present danger test, the plurality relied on Judge Hand's formulation of the test in
his opinion for the Second Circuit in the same case.2 43 Like his balancing test
elsewhere, 244 Hand stated that "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies [an] invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."245 The perceived harm, the overthrow of the government, was obviously
great. That the harm did not result during the period charged in the indictment
was not controlling; instead, the plurality pointed out a number of factors that

235 Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
23 6

See Dow & Shieldes, supranote 175, at 1224 ("Though Congress modeled the statute
on state prohibitions of criminal anarchy, the Smith Act was primarily used as a method of
punishing Communists during a period of fervent anti-Communist sentiment.').
237 Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat 670 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
238 Wells, supranote 220, at 15-17.
239 341 U.S. 494,495 (1951).
240
Id. at 497; Wells, supra note 220, at 7.
241 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507.
242
Id.at 510.
243 Id.

244 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (developing a
negligence formula based on the balancing of various factors).
245 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950).
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made the possibility of overthrow sufficiently real to justify early intervention by
24 6
the government
Not only did Dennis rely on a substantive principle less protective than
Holmes and Brandeis's formulation of the clear and present danger test, it also
rejected the procedural concerns expressed by Holmes and Brandeis. Specifically,
the plurality was willing to take judicial notice of the facts that supported the
conclusion that the danger was sufficiently real to allow the government to
2 47
intervene.
Even as acknowledged by the plurality, before Dennis, the Holmes-Brandeis
view seemed to emerge as the controlling rule of law.2 48 By 1957, fear of the risk
of international communism had diminished. 2 49 While the government continued
to bring Smith Act cases after Dennis'2 50 the Supreme Court began to limit the
government's ability to stifle political dissent. In Yates v. United States, the Court
"reinterpreted" Dennis and reversed the conviction of fourteen members of the
Communist Party because the jury instructions did not make clear the distinction
upon which Dennis supposedly relied, a line between advocacy (advocacy of
abstract doctrine) and incitement (advocacy of action).2 51 While Yates turned on
statutory construction-that is, the Court concluded that the Smith Act prohibited
only advocacy of action-that line surfaced in subsequent cases that began to
2 52
revitalize the Holmes-Brandeis approach to the First Amendment.
C. Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brandenburg, the leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, invited news reporters to a
Klan rally. The prosecutor relied on film footage taken by a cameraman attending
the rally. The film showed twelve hooded figures burning a cross.2 53 Captured on
tape was Brandenburg's speech, including the following remarks:
We're not a revengent organization, but if our President our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken. We are marching on Congress July the Fourth,
four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group
246

Dennis,341 U.S. at 510; see Wells, supra note 220, at 2 (discussing how the plurality
perverted the clear and present danger test).
247
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
248 See id at

507.

249 Wells, supranote 220, at 16-17.
250
Id. at 14.

251 354 U.S. 298, 303, 318-19 (1957), overruledin part by Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1 (1978).
252 Wells, supranote 220, at 2, 16-17.
2 53

Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444,445 (1969).
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to march on St Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi. Thank
2 54
you.
55
A second film recorded a similar speech also given by Brandenburg.
The issue before the Court did not turn on whether Brandenburg's words
were protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the Court held that the state
statute, a criminal syndicalism statute virtually identical to the Smith Act and to
the California statute, upheld in Whitney, was unconstitutional because the statute
"purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment
2 56
assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action."
According to the Court, post-Whitney decisions

fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.2 57
As discussed below, the Supreme Court has revisited its holding in
Brandenburgonly twice in the past thirty years. Those cases have done little to
explain the quoted language.2 58 Professor Gerald Gunther has found in that
language a combination of the best of Hand's approach in Masses and of the
Holmes-Brandeis approach. Specifically, according to Professor Gunther,
"[u]nder Brandenburg,probability of harm is no longer the central criterion for
speech limitations. The inciting language of the speaker-the Hand focus on
'objective' words-is the major consideration. And punishment of the harmless
inciter is prevented by the Schenck-derived requirement of a likelihood of
dangerous consequences. '259 Under that view, protection of speech is greater than
under either the Hand or Holmes-Brandeis approach. A harmless inciter,
unprotected under Hand's approach, is protected because the harm is not

254

Id. at 446. Some First Amendment advocates read Brandenburg too broadly. For
example, Professor Gey asserts that "the speaker in Brandenburg specifically advocated
violence against racial minorities." Gey, supra note 38, at 556. As the language quoted in the
text makes clear, Brandenburg did no such thing. Brandenburgwould be a far more powerful
precedent if the speaker did, in fact, specifically advocate violence against racial minorities,
especially if the Court had concluded that, despite such direct advocacy, the evidence was
insufficient to convict the speaker. As the text makes clear, Brandenburgmade no holding on
the sufficiency of the evidence and held only that the statute was unconstitutional because it
criminalized mere advocacy. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 449.
2 55
Id. at 447.
2 56
Id. at 449.
2 57
Id. at 447.
2 58
See infraPart llI.D.
259 Gunther, supranote 175, at 755.
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sufficiently imminent.2 60 But absent expressly inciting language, a speaker retains
the First Amendment protection under the approach in Masses 2 61
The conclusion that Brandenburgadopted Hand's objective approach ignores
some of the Court's language. For example, the Court states that the First
Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."2 62 Here, the Court seems to have intentionally borrowed Hand's
language of incitement and so would appear consistent with Hand's objective test
in Masses.2 63 For Hand, incitement meant terms that specifically called for
unlawful conduct 2 64 Having invoked Hand's incitement language, the Court
went further to suggest that one who did not incite, but nonetheless had the
265
purpose of "producing" imminent harm, may also be criminalized.
The Court's "producing" language may have been redundant, and merely
means "inciting."266 But that is doubtful. Instead, the Court may well have
intended the language to cover the situation in which the speaker's intent to bring
about the harm was clear, but not necessarily from the express language of the
speech. To borrow Professor Chafee's example, Marc Antony avoided making
explicit incitement to avenge Caesar's assassination.2 67 But any reasonable
listener would have understood that to be his message. Presumably, under Hand's
approach, Antony would be protected by the First Amendment because he did not

260

See supranotes 233-34 and accompanying text.

261 Id.
262

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
See Gunther, supranote 175, at 754-55.
264
See id. at 721 ("f the language used was solely that of direct incitement to illegal
action, speech could be proscribed; otherwise, it was protected.").
265
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
266 That would appear to be implicit in Professor Gunther's important discussion of
Learned Hand's influence on the Court's test in Brandenburg.In asserting that Brandenburg
vindicates Hand's position, he does not consider the meaning of words that are intended to
produce harm and concludes, instead, that "[t]he inciting language of the speaker-the Hand
focus on 'objective' words-is the major consideration.' Gunther, supra note 175, at 755. But
see Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the FirstAmendment: In Defense of
ClearandPresentDanger,70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1176 (1982).
263

The Hess Court relied on the Brandenburg"inciting or producing imminent lawless action"
language. This may indicate that in Brandenburgit had indeed intended to adopt a standard of
temporal imminence. The defendant's statement was so clearly not 'advocacy' of anything,
however, that it is difficult to be sure whether the court believed that the lack of immediacy was
dispositive.

Id.
267 Gunther, supra note 175, at 729 n.41 (letter from Zechariah Chafee Jr. to Learned
Hand).
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use words of direct incitement.2 6 8 By contrast, the Court also allows
criminalization if the speaker whose advocacy is "directed" to "producing"
imminent lawless activity. Indeed, as long as a state has evidence of the speaker's
intent 2 69 extending First Amendment protection to a wily and effective
speaker27 0 -one who simply avoids a direct call to action-protects a dangerous
and culpable offender. 27 1 Thus, contrary to Hand's view, Brandenburgdoes not
make words of incitement a necessary condition for the state to criminalize a
dangerous speaker, as long as the evidence makes clear the speaker's intent to
bring about the harm.
This view, that words of incitement are not a necessary condition, is
consistent with the criminal law generally. Words may constitute part of a number
of crimes. Conspiracy, 272 aiding and abetting where the offender aids by
encouraging the conduct, 2 73 and solicitation 2 74 all may involve one offender

whose primary criminal conduct is speech. For example, a person may be a coconspirator based only upon her agreement that one of the participants commit a
268 Hand's approach had the advantage of certainty, not subject to
the mercy of fact-finders reflecting majoritarian sentiments hostile to dissent ... [Hand] urged,
in Masses and for several years thereafter, the adoption of a strict, 'hard,' 'objective' test
focusing on the speaker's words: if the language used was solely that of direct incitement to
illegal action, speech could be proscribed; otherwise, it was protected.
Id. at 721. But as noted by Professor Gunther, Hand's approach had problems:
As contemporaries recognized, it could not easily deal with the indirect but purposeful
incitement of Marc Anthony's [sic] oration over the body of Caesar. Although Hand recognized
that advocacy could be accomplished by 'indirection,' he insisted on starting with the "literal
meaning" ofthe words and never completely explained how far beyond he was willing to go.
Id. at 729.
26 9
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447-48 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)
(per curiam).
270 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964); cf Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,486 (1984).
271 As indicated by Professor Gunther, Hand "insisted on starting with the 'literal
meaning' of the words" and while he may have been willing to go beyond the "objective"
language, Hand "never completely explained how far beyond he was willing to go.' Gunther,
supra note 175, at 729. Despite Hand's recognition of the social harm posed by the indirect
inciter, that alone was not enough to criminalize the speaker. Id at 728.
272
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1974). In some jurisdictions, a conspiracy may be
complete upon an agreement without any overt act. DRESSLER, supra note 161, § 29.04 [D] ("A
common law conspiracy is complete upon formation of the unlawful agreement. No act in
furtherance of the conspiracy is required.")
273 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1974); DRESSLER, supra note 161, § 30.09
[B][2][a] ("For example, ifS a merchant, sells dynamite to P, with knowledge that P intends to
use the explosives to blow open a safe, S is not an accomplice in the subsequent crime, unless it
was his conscious object to facilitate the commission of the offense").
274
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (1974); DRESSLER, supranote 161, § 28.03[A].
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crime. But nowhere does the criminal law require any express formula before a
person may be held liable. Thus, a conspirator may be found guilty based on an
implied agreement. 275
Although Brandenburg does not explicitly adopt the Holmes-Brandeis
position, the Justices' influence is obvious. At a minimum, the Court's insistence
that harm be imminent appears to incorporate their interpretation of the clear and
present danger test.27 6 Subsequent Supreme Court cases demonstrate the
2 77
continuing influence ofHolmes and Brandeis.
Despite the obvious influence of Holmes and Brandeis, as well as Learned
Hand, Brandenburgleaves open a number of important questions. For example,
as indicated, Brandenburgdoes not make clear whether words of incitement in
connection with imminent harm are merely sufficient to justify criminalizing a
2 78
speaker or whether words of incitement are also a necessary condition to do so.
Another unresolved question is whether, consistent with Brandenburg, a
court must consider the severity of the threatened harm2 79 For example, Justice
Brandeis insisted in his concurring opinion in Whitney that the severity of the
harm was relevant to whether a state may criminalize a person for speech that
creates a risk of harm. In his words, a state may not punish
as a felony the merely voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that
pedestrians had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to

275 For example,

in many conspiracy cases, the government may prove that the agreement

was implicit; no specific formal words of agreement are necessary. DRESSLER, supra note 161,
§ 29.04 [A].
276
See Gunther, supra note 175, at 754-55 (stating that Brandenburg's "reference to
'imminent' reflects a limited influence of Holmes, combined with later experience"); see also
TRIBE, supranote 175, at 616 ('The current doctrinal synthesis, combining the best of Hand's
views with the best of Holmes' and Brandeis', is that of Brandenburgv. Ohio...
277
See infra Part Im.D.
278
See supra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
279 Writing for the Second Circuit in Dennis v. UnitedStates, Judge Hand found that, even

where the risk of harm is slight, when the magnitude of the harm was great, the state may be
able to criminalize speech. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("In each
case they must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."). Chief Justice Vinson

adopted that formulation of the clear and present danger test in his plurality opinion in Dennis.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,510 (1951) (Vinson, J., plurality). The second part of the
Court's Brandenburgtest suggests that the risk of harm must be significant, i.e., the harm must
be "imminent.' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969). But it is unclear whether the

Court adheres to the view that the magnitude of the harm is relevant to its analysis. In dictum,
the Court has stated that "a court [must] make its own inquiry into the imminence and
magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then to balance the
character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered
expression." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
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advocate their doing so, even if there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead
to a trespass.... There must be the probability of serious injury to the State.2 80
As developed below, the Supreme Court has revisited its incitement test only
twice in the past thirty years.2 8 1 Those cases have not resolved questions like the
ones posed here.
D. Post-Brandenburg Developments-Supreme CourtPrecedent
Since Brandenburg, the Supreme Court has addressed incitement in two
cases. The first, Hess v. Indiana, involved a case arising out of anti-war
protests.2 82 The second, NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo., dealt with a civil
action against the NAACP for damages resulting to white-owned businesses from
a protracted boycott aimed at ending racially discriminatory practices.2 8 3 While
Hess refines the Brandenburgtest to a limited degree, neither case, especially
Claiborne Hardware, has drawn meaningful lines governing criminalizing
incitement. 2 84
In Hess, a local sheriff and his deputies were in the process of clearing the
streets of antiwar protesters who were blocking traffic. 285 According to a
stipulation, Hess, one of the protesters, said, 'We'll take the fucking street later,"
or, 'We'll take the fucking street again.' 2 86 Two witnesses testified that Hess was
not "exhorting the crowd to go back into the street... that his statement did not
appear to be addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone,
although loud, was no louder than that of the other people in the area.' a87 Hess
challenged his conviction for disorderly conduct on a number of grounds,
including the argument that the statute, applied to his conduct, violated the First
Amendment.2 88
In a per curium opinion, the Court agreed. Hess's words did not come within
those narrowly limited classes of speech beyond the protection of the First
Amendment.2 89 The Court rejected the State's argument that his words were

280 Whitney

v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,

concurring).
281 See infra Part lI.D.
282 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
283 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
2 84

See infraPart 1I.D.

285 Hess, 414 U.S. at 106.
2 86
Id at 107.
287 Id.
2 88

Id.at 105-06.
289 Id. at 107.
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intended to incite further lawless action. 290 The Court found the comments to be
ambiguous: Hess's statement may have been a call for moderation or, at worst, a
call for illegal action at some unspecified future time.2 9 1 Even if Hess's statement
was a call for future illegal action, the State failed to demonstrate any specific
2 92
action or any imminent violence.
Although not explicit in the per curiam opinion, Hess suggests that, in First
Amendment cases, the appellate court has a greater role than in other cases. The
trial court found specifically that Hess intended "to incite further lawless action on
the part of the crowd... and was likely to produce such action."2 93 As made clear
by the dissent 294 and by later Supreme Court cases, 295 the majority conducted an
independent review of the record and substituted its judgment for that of the trial
court. In doing so, the Court acted contrary to the usual standards of appellate
review whereby the appellee is entitled to a consideration of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the appellee. 296 The opinion
also implicitly appears to have placed the burden on the State to prove that the
297
speech was not protected by the First Amendment
The Court showed a similar unwillingness to accept a lower court's
determination that speech amounts to an "incitement" in its unanimous decision
in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo. 298 There, the Court overturned a damages
award against the NAACP and several individual defendants for a boycott of
white-owned businesses in Mississippi.2 99
The Mississippi courts found that NAACP leader Charles Evers was liable
because of speeches that led to violence against African Americans who violated
the boycott.300 In rejecting the state supreme court's determination that Evers
could be found liable, the Court discussed three possible theories by which Evers
might be found liable for the conduct of others: if he authorized, directed, or
ratified specific tortious activity of others; if his speeches were likely to incite
lawless activity of his listeners within a reasonable period of time; or, if he gave
specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats. 301 Despite the lower court
290

Id. at 108 ('The Indiana Supreme Court placed primary reliance on the trial court's

finding that Hess's statement 'was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the
crowd in the vicinity of appellant and was likely to produce such action.").
291

Id.

292 Id. at 109.
293

Id at 108.

294

Id. at 109, 111-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
295 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984).
296 See, e.g., Boutros v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 655 F.2d 1257, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
297
See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
298 458 U.S. 886, 886-87 (1982).
299 Id.
300 Id/
301 Id. at 927.
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determination that Evers did incite the violent acts of boycott supporters, the
Supreme Court held that his speeches were within "the bounds of protected
302
speech set forth in Brandenburg."
On one occasion, Evers told his audience that "the blacks who traded with
white merchants would be answerable to him," and "any 'uncle toms' who broke
the boycott would 'have their necks broken' by their own people." 30 3 On another
occasion, he told a group that boycott violators would be disciplined by their own
people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with them at night.3 04 In yet
another speech, he stated that "if we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."305 Subsequently, boycott supporters
injured violators of the boycott.30 6 However, Evers's statements were protected
speech because the violence occurred months or weeks after the speeches.3 07 In
effect, the Court substituted its judgment for the trial court and determined that
the speeches did not incite the violence. To hold otherwise, said the Court, would
have led to imposition of liability based on a public address consisting mostly of
"highly charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment."30 8
Claiborne Hardware was even more explicit than Hess in recognizing a
different standard of review on appeal in First Amendment cases. An appellate
court's role in cases involving the First Amendment is to make an independent
review of the record "to examine critically the basis upon which liability was
imposed." 309 An examination of the Court's opinion demonstrates that the Court
exercised its independent judgment in overturning the trial court's findings.
While it unquestionably read the record in a way that favored speech, the
Court left no doubt that the State retains an interest in pursuing those who do
incite imminent action. For example, it stated that had Evers's strong language
"been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented
whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful
conduct."3 10
The Supreme Court has left for the lower courts numerous difficult questions
about the meaning of Brandenburg.But three principles emerge from its short
line of precedent. First, when speech values are at stake, a court has a heightened
duty to review the record independently to determine whether the findings below

302

Id.at 928.

303

Id.at 900 n.28.

304 Id.at 902.

305 Id.

306Id.
at 904-06.

307 Id.
at 928.
30

8 Id.at 926-27.
Id. at 915 n.50; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964).
3 10
ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 928.
30 9
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are justified.3 11 Second, the Court will not lightly find that threatened harm is
imminent; at least not absent a showing that the threatened harm has come shortly
after the speech.3 12 Third, a state must prove the speaker's intent to bring about
the harm; the Court will read ambiguous evidence of the speaker's intent in favor
of the speaker. The Court requires intent not mere knowledge, that the harm will
occur.

31 3

E. The Pre-BrandenburgCases afterBrandenburg
The Supreme Court has seldom applied its own test in Brandenburg; 314 nor
has the Court explicitly repudiated its pre-Brandenburgdecisions, except for its
express overruling of Whitney v. California.3 15
To gauge whether the defendants' conduct in PlannedParenthooddeserves
First Amendment protection, analysis of how the pre-Brandenburgcases might
be resolved under the Court's current approach to incitement is worthwhile. Many
of those cases involved speech both containing political content and advocating
lawless activity, similar to the rhetoric and conduct of the Planned Parenthood
defendants.
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court contended that its new holding was
consistent with its holding in Dennis, and it has never overruled, with the
exception of Whitney, its other anti-communist cases and the World War I Era
cases. 3 16 If those cases are still good law, the Nuremberg Files would almost
certainly not be entitled to First Amendment protection. That is, if the evidence in
cases like Schenck, Abrams, Debs, and Dennis was sufficient to sustain criminal
convictions, so too would be the evidence against the creators of the Nuremberg
Files.
In all of these cases, the government proved the defendants' intent based on a
fairly remote chain of inferences. For example, in Schenck and Debs, the Court
upheld the jury's finding of intent as long as the jury found that the "natural and
intended effect' of the defendants' antiwar activity was to frustrate the war
effort.3 17 In Abrais, the Court sustained the defendants' convictions under the
Espionage Act where their actual intent was to hinder the United States'
311 Id. at 915 n.50; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
312 ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 928.
313 Hess, 414

U.S. at 109.

314 But see

id.; ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 928 (listing examples of the Supreme

Court using the Brandenburgtest).
315 Brandenburg, 395

U.S. at 449. Scholars have assumed that Brandenburg does
repudiate many of its earlier, restrictive First Amendment cases. Wells, supra note 220, at
10n.40.
3 16

3 17

Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211,214-15 (1919).
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intervention against the Bolshevik Revolution. 31 8 The criminal intent, to interfere
with the war effort against the Germans, was established through the defendants'
knowledge that their conduct would interfere with that effort.3 19
As developed in more detail below,320 evidence of the defendants' intent to
harm the plaintiffs in PlannedParenthoodis unequivocal, even under the higher
3 21
standard that has evolved in Brandenburg,Hess, and ClaiborneHardware.
Evidence that the defendants knew that posting information about abortion
providers, including their home and business addresses, might lead to their
murder, even without frther evidence of intent, would seem to satisfy the low
322
threshold in the early clear and present danger cases.
So too would evidence of a sufficient danger satisfy the early clear and
present danger cases. In cases like Schenck, Abrams, Debs, and Dennis, the Court
relieved the prosecution of any meaningful demonstration that the feared harm
was imminent. In Schenck, Abrams, and Debs, the prosecutor did not have to
show that anyone read the antiwar pamphlets or heard the antiwar speeches and
was moved to resist the war effort. 323 The prosecutor had to show only the
necessary intent (but, as indicated above, a rather watered-down showing), along
with some overt act to further the unlawful goal. 3 24
Again, by comparison, the evidence of imminent harm in the Planned
Parenthoodcase easily meets the low threshold in the cited cases. As argued
below, the harm-the murder and attempted murder of abortion providers-is not
only imminent, but has occurred repeatedly. 325 And as cases like Debs make
clear, speech itself may be sufficient to provide the overt act necessary to sustain a
criminal conviction, as long as the harm is sufficiently imminent 3 26 Hence, even
though the Nuremberg Files only constitute speech, the illegal harm is far more
imminent than the violent overthrow of the government or the frustration of the
war effort, both of which were found sufficiently clear and present in the earlier
cases.
Despite the Supreme Court's denial that it overruled cases like Dennis, its
denial is open to doubt. 3 27 The Court has come to the view espoused by Holmes
318 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,616 (1919).
3 19

320

Id. at 623-24.

See infra Part IV.A.
321 See supranotes 256-57,290-91, 311-13 and accompanying text.
322
See Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. The Court affirmed a jury instruction requiring Debs'
words to have "as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effecf ' the obstruction of the
draft. Id. See also Abrams, 250 U.S. at 623-24.
323
See supranotes 180-93 and accompanying text.
324 Id.

325 See infra Part IV.B.3.
326
Debs, 249 U.S. at 216.
327 Wells, supranote 220, at 10 nAO. Part of the problem with the Court's test is that it has
been subject to manipulation. See id. at 62.
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and Brandeis that the Court must review the record independently to determine
the sufficiency of the evidence.32 8 It has required clear evidence of a specific
intent to bring about the feared harm.3 2 9 It has demanded that the harm be
330
"extremely serious" and "the degree of imminence extremely high.
Imminence apparently requires a showing of a close temporal proximity between
3 31
speech and violence.
In light of that, were Dennis or the World War I Era cases to arise today, the
results would almost certainly be different. For example, in the World War I
cases, the government would likely have to demonstrate specific intent.
Knowledge alone would be insufficient. 332 Evidence of intent would have to be
unambiguous.3 33 The government would have to prove that the war effort had
been, or was about to be, impaired by the defendants' conduct 3 3 4 Presumably, in
Dennis,the government would have to prove that the defendants intended that the
violent overthrow of the government occur in the near future and that violent
conduct to achieve that end had taken place or was about to take place. 335 The
government would have to prove more than the fact that defendants circulated
Marxist propaganda or gave anti-war speeches. Those kinds of conduct may
involve expressions of unpopular speech, even "vitriolic public debate,"33 6 but
more is required to justify their criminalization.
Recognizing that the Espionage Act and Smith Act cases should come out
differently today does not leave the states unable to criminalize dangerous speech.
As discussed above, vitriolic speech may cross the line and become unlawful
incitement.337 But also, with the exception of Claiborne Hardware, the
incitement cases have all involved defendants whose alleged crime involved
3 28 Hess

v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam); NAACP v. Claiborne

Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,915 n.50 (1982).
329 Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
33 0
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
331 ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 928.
33 2

See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09 ("Andsince there was no evidence, or rational inference

from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce,
imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the grounds that they had
'a tendency to lead to violence."'); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919)
(Holmes, J. dissenting) ("mhe United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces
or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent").
333 Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
334
335

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09 (holding that under the Brandenburgtest, Hess's words

were punishable only if they were "intended to produce" and were "likely to produce imminent
disorder').
336
Viele, Newspaper Article, supranote 19.
337 Seesupranote 310 and accompanying text.
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speech critical of governmental policy. The early questions challenged the war
effort and the draf 338 later cases involved participation in the Communist Party,
involving the overthrow of the capitalist system. 3 39 In Brandenburg,the state
attempted to criminalize a Klansman who was threatening some kind of political
protest.340 Hess involved anti-war protests. 34 1 The incitement cases all involved
speech that could be characterized as political dissent.
33 8

See supranotes 180-86 and accompanying text (discussing Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), which held that the distribution of leaflets opposing the draft posed a "clear
and present danger" of resulting in an outcome Congress has the power to prevent); see also
supranotes 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), which held that the authors of circulars criticizing the war must be accountable for the
effects their circulars were likely to produce); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect a newspaper article criticizing American
participation in a foreign war). In Frohwerk,newspaper articles declared it a mistake to send
American soldiers to France, claimed that drafted men were being sent to a foreign land to fight
in a cause that neither they nor anyone else knew anything of, and reached the conviction that
this was but a war to protect some rich men's money. Frohwerk was found guilty on all counts
except one. In upholding Frohwerk's conviction, the Court noted that the First Amendment,
while prohibiting legislation against free speech, could not have been, and obviously was not,
intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. The Court determined that the
judge's discretion was wrongfully exercised and that there was no ground on which to reverse.
See also supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919), which held that the intent to obstruct the recruiting service while delivering a
speech about socialism was not speech protected by the First Amendment).
339
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that a "Left Wing Manifesto"
advocating the duty to overthrow the government was direct incitement and not protected by
the First Amendment). Gitlow arranged for the printing of a paper and delivered the first issue
containing "The Left Wing Manifesto," a Communist Program and a Program of the Left
Wing, to the printer. Sixteen thousand copies were made and Gitlow paid for them. Gitlow was
tried and convicted for the statutory crime of criminal anarchy. The first count of the indictment
charged that Gitlow had advocated, advised, and taught the duty, necessity, and propriety of
overthrowing and overturning organized government by force, violence, and unlawful means in
certain writings entitled 'The Left Wing Manifesto." Id. at 655. The Court determined that the
Manifesto was neither the statement of abstract doctrine nor mere prediction that industrial
disturbances and revolutionary mass strikes would result spontaneously. Id. at 665. Instead, the
Court determined that the Manifesto advocated and urged mass action that should progressively
incite industrial disturbances, and through political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action,
overthrow and destroy organized parliamentary government. Id. at 665-66. The Court further
determined that the Manifesto contained the language of direct incitement and was not
Constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 670. See also supra notes 201-17 and accompanying
text (discussing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which held that prosecution of a
person for participation in the Communist Labor Party did not violate the Due Process clause of
the Constitution); supra notes 239-52 and accompanying text (discussing Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which held that an organizer of the Communist Party could be
Constitutionally convicted of violating the Smith Act when "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger").
340
See supraPart III.C (discussing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
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Cases involving political dissent are those in which the First Amendment
values are most important. Scholars have noted the failure of the Supreme Court
to articulate a clear theory explaining the First Amendment. 342 In turn, numerous
scholars have urged that the First Amendment advances individual autonomy and
protects individual liberty and self-fulfillment.343 Furthermore, they justify the
First Amendment in terms of the pursuit of truth, freedom from state imposed
orthodoxy, or assurance of an informed self-government. 344 Still other scholars
have justified free speech based on appropriate distrust of government. 345 For
example, Professor Schauer has argued that freedom of speech is based largely on
a distrust of governmental determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation of
the fallibility of political leaders, and a deeper distrust of governmental power in a
more general sense. 346 Virtually all of the justifications for the First Amendment
recognize its special importance in the political arena, where governmental
officials have the greatest incentive to silence dissent and democratic values are
most obviously at stake. Dissent spurs public debate about how we should govern
347
ourselves.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment's protection is
most important when the speech relates to governmental policy. For example,
core speech is afforded greater protection than commercial speech 348 or
34 1 See supra notes 282-97

and accompanying text (discussing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.

105 (1973) (per curiam)).
342

See generally EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970)

(explaining that four primary values have been thought to be served by free speech: "advancing
knowledge and 'truth' in the 'market place of ideas,' facilitating representative democracy and
self-govemment, promoting individual autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment, and
achieving a more adaptable and more stable community.'); see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Review Essay, Alternate Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 101-02 (1999) ("Current First Amendment doctrine ... may have reached such a
point of incoherence and indeterminacy that this kind of common understanding no longer
exists.).
343
34 4

345

See generally EMERSON, supranote 342, at 6-7.
Id.

See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (discussing the idea that government abuse of power can be
prevented by free speech).
346 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

34 (1982).

347

KATHLoq M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNgHER, FIRSTAMENDMENT LAW 6 (1999).
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779
(1976); TRIBE, supra note 175, at 651 ("More generally, an advertisement proposing an
34 8

unlawful transaction may be forbidden on the theory that the harm threatened is within
government's power to prevent-and that more speech cannot be expected to avert it.'); see
also id at 654-55. A state cannot regulate
an activity based on the premise that ignorance is preferable to knowledge.... [IMhe values of
free speech are not limited to political dialogue but extend to any exchange of ideas or
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obscenity.3 49 In its defamation cases, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized
a distinction between private citizens and public officials. Because of the need to
foster vigorous public debate, public officials have limited protection against
defamatory statements.3 50 By contrast, states may choose to give greater
protection to private citizens, unless they thrust themselves into the vortex of
public debate.3 51 Cases like New York Times v. Sullivan suggest that the First
Amendment's role in supporting political debate does not leave private citizens at
risk of harm from their fellow citizens. 352

information that might make individual choices better informed.... [C]ommercial information
"is... indispensable to the formulation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered."

Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy,425 U.S. at 765).
349 Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); TRIBE, supranote 175, at 661. Miller creates
guidelines that the trier of fact must follow: a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest ... b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual
conduct specifically defined in applicable state law... c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id.

350

See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL, UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 21.03[A] (1996). The
Supreme Court has held that a public official can prevail in a defamation action only if the
official demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's statement was
made with actual malice. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,281 (1964).
351 See DIAMOND ErAT, supranote 350, § 21.03[B].
Substantial litigation has involved who constitutes a public figure for defamation purposes. The
Court has recognized two general categories of public figures: an all-purpose public figure, who
is someone widely known (like William F. Buckley, Michael Jordan or Madonna) and a limited
public figure, who is a person who either "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues"
related to that person's public figure status.
Id. Despite First Amendment concerns, the Court has not lightly found that a private citizen has
met the public figure standard-indeed in most of its cases it has held that the citizen is a
private, not public, figure.
352 he effect of cases like Firestone and Gertz is that a state retains broad power to
protect private citizens from harm while assuring vigorous public debate. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The First
Amendment malice requirement does not apply if the plaintiff is a private citizen who has not
become a public figure. States are, therefore, free to protect such individuals without First
Amendment concerns.
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IV. THE NUREMBERG FILES

A. The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment: The Intent
Requirement
Under current Supreme Court law, when a prosecutor brings a case that
involves the line between incitement and advocacy, the evidence must
demonstrate an unequivocal specific intent to bring about an evil properly
addressed by the legislature. 353 This section considers whether the record in
Planned Parenthoodand evidence available elsewhere would be sufficient to
demonstrate that the Planned Parenthooddefendants intended violence against
abortion providers to result from publication of their posters and the Nuremberg
Files.
Were the PlannedParenthooddefendants charged with inciting or producing
violence against abortion providers, a prosecutor would have ample evidence of
their intent. A jury would be entitled to consider the contents of the Nuremberg
Files themselves. For example, several aspects of the files demonstrate more than
a legitimate effort to collect data for possible future Nuremberg type trials. The
website catalogued the fate of those about whom data has been collected.354 The

files not only asked for data but provided it for website visitors. It also provided
3 55
links to inflammatory material, including grotesque pictures of aborted fetuses.

353 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has not
stated specifically that its intent requirement in incitement cases is equivalent to the traditional
specific intent requirement, but they certainly would appear to be equivalent That is, in crimes
requiring specific intent or purpose as the relevant mental state, the prosecutor must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender intended to bring about the unlawful result See
DRESSLER, supra note 161, § 8.01. In many criminal cases, prosecutors have far less evidence
of intent than in the Planned Parenthoodcase where the defendants had made numerous
statements concerning their views on the justified use of violence against abortion providers.
Instead, in the typical prosecution where the offender has not confessed, the prosecution must
rely on inferences from perceived facts. For example, a prosecutor must rely on an inference
that an actor intends the natural and probable consequences of her action. See DRESSLER, supra
note 161, § 8.03.
[I]n County Courtof Ulster County v. Allen, the Supreme Court upheld an instruction to the jury
that permitted it to infer from presence of two firearms in an automobile that all four occupants
of the vehicle were in illegal possession of the weapons. In the case, two very heavy, largecaliber handguns were positioned crosswise in the open handbag of a 16-year-old female
occupant. The bag was either on the front seat or front floor of the car that contained her and
three adult males. The Supreme Court held that, as applied to the facts of this case, the inference
of constructive possession on the part of the four defendants was rationally based.
Id.

3 54
3 55

NurembergFiles,supra note 6.
Id.
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The files made numerous calls for justice, and here, especially with links to Paul
Hill's essay discussing his sense of peace and God's call for him to kill
Dr. Britton and other inflammatory information, the call for justice means one
thing. Justice means what Bray and others define as natural justice, the right to
kill those who kill the innocent. 356 As explained by one affiant whose evidence
was submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment in
PlannedParenthood,the posters
are calling for the reader to intervene against a murderer who will kill if you don't
stop him. Without regard to any advocacy for or against abortion, the fact is that these
physicians are not murderers according to the law. So the characterization is
357
inflammatory and places them at undue risk.
The website did not merely make an argument that under the doctrine of
necessity, a person may commit homicide to protect an innocent life against a
culpable offender. That argument would be entitled to full First Amendment
protection. Instead, the files and the links on the website allowed a strong
inference that the site creators were encouraging readers to commit acts of
violence against abortion providers. The links justified killing abortion providers
and inflamed the viewers' passion, and then provided viewers with information
necessary to act on those inflamed passions. The creators told viewers who
among those on the site were still working and where the viewer could find
abortion providers. 358 Absent some competing inferences, a jury would be
entitled to infer the intent for their readers to commit violence from the creator's
3 59
knowledge that the site could incite violence
In their writings, Bray and Ramey make the moral, Biblical, and legal
arguments justifying murder.360 That looks like the kind of advocacy that is now
protected under cases like Yates and Brandenburg.But the website went well
beyond abstract discussion. It identified potential victims and told would-be
killers where to find thern.3 6 1
In Hess and ClaiborneHardware,the evidence of the speakers' intent was
far more equivocal than the evidence in PlannedParenthood,where the record
revealed substantial evidence concerning the defendants' commitment to
violence. Hess's remarks were truly equivocal. As construed by the majority, his
comment, "We'll take the fucking street later," was either a call for action, but for
action at some indefinite future time, and thus not a call for imminent action, or a
356

See A TIMETO KILL, supra note 46, at 105; supra Part II.D.1.
357 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 64-65.
358
See supranotes 53-57 and accompanying text.
359 People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 478 (1967); People v. McLaughlin, 111

Cal. App. 2d 781,789 (1952); United States v. Ramirez, 139 F.3d 34,44-45 (5th Cir. 1998).
360

See supranotes 82-98 and accompanying text.
361 See supranotes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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call for present moderation.3 62 In fact, Hess's conduct immediately after his
statement did not suggest that it was a call to immediate action. He apparently
faced the crowd, made the comment to no one in particular and made no effort to
363
take the street back from the police.
In ClaiborneHardware,Evers gave emotionally charged speeches that the
Court acknowledged could be construed as a call to violence. For example, he
raised the fear that African-Americans who violated the proposed boycott of
white businesses would be disciplined and that "necks would be broken."3 64 But
the Court found that the speeches were protected by the First Amendment. The
Court's review of the full text of Evers's remarks led it to conclude that they were
within "the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg [because] the
lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to
unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and economic
' 365
power available to them.
The Nuremberg Files did contain a disclaimer. But examined in context, the
district court concluded that the disclaimer was unconvincing. 366 The webpage
included the following information: the abortion providers are accused of
committing crimes against humanity and the hope is that some day, they will be
executed, albeit after trial. 3 67 As summarized by one witness, "characterizing
someone as a murderer who is not legally a murder[er] provides justification for
homicide.... [The Nuremberg Files] are calling for the reader to intervene
36 8
against a murderer who will kill if you don't stop him."
In proving the defendants' intent, a prosecutor would not be limited to the
text of the Nuremberg Files itself, even if the disclaimer on the website created
doubt about their intent.369 For example, the defendants have left an extensive
trail documenting their views on the use of violence against abortion providers.
Bray and Ramey have published their views that killing abortion providers is
morally and legally justified. Bray created and sold a bumper sticker that read
"EXECUTE ABORTIONISTS MURDERERS. '370 Other defendants used the
same slogan or placed the bumper sticker on their cars.3 7 1 The defendants
362

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).

363 Id. at 107; see supra notes 312-13.

364 NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,927 (1982).
3 65

Id. at 928.

3 66

See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133
(D. Or. 1999).
367

NuremburgFiles,supra note 6.
368 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 64.
369

In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that their statements
could not be viewed in context. As plaintiffs argued in opposition to that motion, intent may
(and often must) be inferred from context. Id. at 41-51.
370 See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
371 Id. at 1139.
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precipitated a split within the anti-abortion movement and were active in forming
ACLA because they refused to commit to nonviolence 3 72 Various defendants
supported Griffen, Shannon, and Hill after they killed or wounded abortion
providers. 373 They gave financial, personal, and public support and circulated
petitions urging acquittal of the defendants. 374 Repeated statements and actions in
support of abortion killers along with the contents of the website itself
demonstrate sufficient evidence of many of the defendants' intent in creating the
375
website.
The timing of publication of the Nuremberg Files would also be relevant to
the intent of the defendants. The defendants were obviously aware that posting
the names of abortion providers would lead to their murder or attempted murder.
Prior to David Gunn's murder, he was the subject of a wanted poster that included
the kind of personal data that the defendants included on the website.376
Similarly, two other abortion doctors were the subject of wanted posters before
their murders. 3 77 The defendants were aware of the connection between the
appearance of a doctor's name and personal data on a wanted poster and the
subsequent attempt on his life.378 Before creating their own "Deadly Dozen"
poster, some of the defendants consulted with the people who created earlier
wanted posters that preceded Gun and Britton's murders. 379
In some contexts, the law distinguishes between knowledge and intent 3 80
Knowledge may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction if a crime requires intent.
Brandenburg and the post-Brandenburg cases require a showing of intent,
apparently in contravention of the earlier cases where knowledge that a result
might follow from one's conduct was sufficient to nullify First Amendment
protection.38 1 But knowledge remains relevant when a prosecutor must prove
intent. A sufficient showing of knowledge may allow an inference of a
defendant's intent. 382

1136.
Id. at 1137, 1139, 1140, 1142-46, 1148-49.

372 Id.at
373
374

Id.

375 See supra Part II.D.

376 See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
37 7
Id. at 1134-35.
378 Id.

379 See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
380 MODELPENAL CODE, § 2.06, cmt.3 (1974); Id. at § 5.01, cmt.7.
381 Compare Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam) (applying the

Brandenburgtest that speech is punishable if it both is intended to produce and is likely to
produce imminent disorder), with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 620-22 (1919)
(holding that if speech is likely to produce certain effects, then its speakers "must have
intended" those effects, even if the speaker had a different purpose and intent).
382 MODELPENAL CODE, § 2.06, cmt.5 (1974).
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That the defendants made repeated and consistent statements endorsing
violence against abortion providers distinguishes this case from Hess and
Claiborne Hardware.Hess made a single statement in a context not strongly
corroborative of a criminal intent 383 Evers's speeches were filled with statements
that contradicted an endorsement of violence.3 84 The Claiborne Hardware
plaintiffs offered no other evidence of Evers's intent.385 The PlannedParenthood
defendants have spoken repeatedly and clearly and have backed up their words
with consistent action.
Another issue might arise with regard to the defendants' intent One problem
in Brandenburgand the Smith Act and Espionage Act cases (if they have been
effectively overruled by Brandenburg)may be that when a speaker talks in
generalities about the vengeance that a group may take against others or about the
eventual and inevitable overthrow of the govemment the speaker has not
evidenced an intent to encourage any particular crime. That issue was not
specifically addressed in Brandenburgbecause the Court held only that the statute
violated the First Amendment because it criminalized mere advocacy. But a
plausible consideration in whether a speaker was advocating instead of inciting
3 86
may be whether the speaker urges the commission of a specific crime.
If that were the case, a defendant like Brandenburg would be entitled to a
First Amendment defense because he spoke only of some conditional and
imprecise conduct to be taken if government leaders continued to suppress the
white race. He did not incite any specific criminal act. 3 87 Similarly, if the
Communist and Espionage cases would come out differently today, merely
teaching the wisdom of Leninist-Marxist principles would be insufficient to
amount to incitement, presumably because there was no intent to incite a specific
3 88
crime and not just because the harm was not imminent.

383

Hess, 414 U.S. at 107.

384 NAACP
385

v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,927-28 (1982).

Id. at 929.
First Amendment advocates have read Brandenburg too broadly. In arguing that
the District Court erred in Planned Parenthood, Professor Gey states that the defendant in
386 Some

Brandenburg "specifically advocated violence against racial minorities" Gey, supra note 38, at
556. That is inaccurate. See supra notes 253-57. But see Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d
233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant, a book publisher, could be found liable
as an aider and abettor to murder, even though the publisher was not aware of who the
particular victim would be).
387 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,445-47 (1969).
388
In Brandenburg,the Court summed up its earlier holdings as having fashioned a rule

requiring advocacy of imminent lawless action. 395 U.S. at 447. Presumably, the speaker must
urge the commission of a particular crime, i.e., the lawless action.
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Urging commission of a particular crime with a particular victim starts to
look like inciting, not advocating.3 8 9 Thus, had Brandenburg said, "Let's show
the government that we are serious by burning the house of the first AfricanAmerican we can find," such a speech would almost certainly cross the line to
incitement. Were a speaker to say to the audience not only that violent revolution
was inevitable and desirable but that the group ought to begin the revolution by
storming the Pentagon or General Motors, the speaker would lose any First
Amendment protection, that is, if the imminence requirement was also
390
satisfied.
By analogy, defendants Bray and Ramey could not be prosecuted for their
writings in which they argue that the killing of an abortion provider is morally and
legally justified. That kind of speech would appear to be the abstract advocation
of violence, not its incitement. 39 1 But the Nuremberg Files and the Deadly Dozen
posters do more than make an abstract appeal to violence. In their writing, Bray
and Ramey avoid identifying any particular abortion provider who should be
killed. But by naming names and providing other information that assists the
reader of the Nuremberg Files to target specific victims, the PlannedParenthood
defendants have crossed the line between mere advocacy and have incited
specific crime.3 92
The point raised earlier, that virtually all of the Supreme Court cases
involving incitement versus advocacy have involved criticism of governmental
policy, has special importance at this juncture. 393 In all of those cases, a factfinder would have difficulty determining whether the speaker intended to change
the government's policy through lawful dissent or through unlawful acts of
sabotage or violence.3 94 Bringing about an end to the United States' involvement
in an unjust war is a legitimate goal of political debate.395 Given the widely
389

In such a case, the speaker would appear to be advocating action rather than
advocating abstract doctrine. As indicated in Yates v. United States, advocating action is not
protected by the First Amendment. 354 U.S. 298,320 (1957).
390
See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,400-02 (7th Cir. 1972).
391 See Yates, 354 U.S. 298; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
392 By comparison, in Hess, the Court could not determine Hess's intent, if he was urging
a crime to occur, or when it would occur. The Court would have been faced with a different
situation if Hess had said, "Storm the Bastille, tomorrow night!" Specifying the crime to be
committed clarifies the intent. Posting the names of doctors in a context in which the speakers
are urging violence against them leaves little doubt about the specific crime that is being urged.
This is no debate about the morality of killing abortion providers; it is an invitation to kill the
named doctors.
393
See supranotes 337-41 and accompanying text.
394
See supranote 337.

395 For example, a candidate's support or opposition to the war in Vietnam was the single
most important issue in the Democratic primary elections in 1968. See TH-EODORE H. WHrrF,
THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972, at 71 (1973) ('CThe primaries of 1968 forced the wind-
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shared view that the First Amendment protects political dissent and self
government,3 96 the Court properly should create special protection to prevent
chilling political dissent where the "inciter" may merely intend to further vigorous
397
public debate. But just as in the defamation cases involving private figures,
protection of individuals' interests increases as the area of discussion is further
from legitimate public debate. As the speaker moves from discussion of issues of
public concern, such as governmental policy, to revelation of private data about
individuals, a fact-finder is more justified in finding that the speaker's intent is not
to engage in public discourse.
Concern over the PlannedParenthooddefendants' right to speak about their
unpopular views is legitimate. But they are free to criticize the Court. Likewise,
they are free to write about the Court's usurpation of states' power and the
immorality of its position. They are free to write that killing an abortion provider
is morally and Biblically justified. 398 They are free to demonstrate within
reasonable distance of abortion clinics even though that conduct starts to impinge
on personal rights.3 99 What they cannot do, consistent with the First Amendment,
is to provide potential assassins with useful information about abortion providers
with the intent to increase the risk of violence against their targets.
To underscore the last point, were a person to hand a would-be assassin the
names and addresses of potential victims with the intent that the assassin kill the
named victim, no lawyer would raise a First Amendment defense if the person
were charged as an accessory to murder. 40 0 One might argue that the difference
between the aider who hands information to a would-be assassin and the Planned
Parenthood defendants who published the "unWanted" posters and the
Nuremberg Files is that the Planned Parenthood defendants published their
information openly. But I contend that should not change the legal analysis.
Posting the information on the Intemet, rather than handing it directly to a woulddown of the Vietnam War as first Eugene McCarthy, then Robert Kennedy illuminated the
disgust of Americans with the war in Asia.").
396 See SuLLiVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 374,
at 4.
Free speech has been thought to serve three principal values: advancing knowledge and "truth"
in the "marketplace of ideas," facilitating representative democracy and self-government, and
promoting individual autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment... These values have
animated much of the Court's reasoning in free speech cases, though not always articulately and
not always consistently.
Id. (citing EMERSON, supra note 342).
397
See supranotes 350-52 and accompanying text.
398
See supra notes 328-36 and accompanying text.
399
See generally Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc. 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (discussing
whether establishing a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around entrances to clinics violates the First
Amendment).
4 00
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1974); Morisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207,211

(1993).
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be assassin, may allow a defendant to argue that she lacked the intent to aid the
would-be assassin, presumably on the theory that no sane person would expose
her criminal conduct to all the world. But that does not provide an absolute
defense.
Such a defense would be factual. That is, simply soliciting a crime or aiding
crime over the Internet for all to see cannot provide a complete legal defense. For
example, no one would seriously suggest that solicitation of sex with a minor
conducted over the Internet is protected by the First Amendment simply because
it is done where others may see the communication.4 0 1 While a jury might believe
the factual assertion that an actor lacked the intent to aid a would-be assassin
because she openly communicated on a website or over the Internet, the
determination of intent would turn on the facts of the specific case.40 2 In addition,
while use of the Internet may demonstrate that one lacks the intent its use may
cut the other way as well. Its use may be far more powerful than trying to locate
an individual would-be assassin; that is, an actor may expose herself to greater
risk of detection by using the Internet or a website like the Nuremberg Files, but
she also increases the likelihood of successfully stopping an abortion provider by
publishing personal information, not otherwise available, to a larger pool of
would-be assassins.
The PlannedParenthooddefendants' intent in publishing the "unWanted"
posters and the Nuremberg Files would, therefore, be a factual inquiry. As argued
above, they have left a significant paper trail that creates a strong inference of
their intent4 03 Posting information for all to see may or may not convince a factfinder that they lacked the intent that otherwise seems to be amply supported by
the record. The defendants are not in a position to deny knowledge that the kind
of activity in which they have engaged has led to the death and injury of abortion
providers.4 0 4 That knowledge is strong evidence of intent.40 5 Even the claim that
a person would not openly communicate his criminal purpose may not be
convincing. Some of the anti-abortion participants have acknowledged their acts

401 Cf Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 223(d)
(1994 & Supp. 1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (discussing the Communications
Decency Act provisions that protect minors from harmful material on the Internet); see also
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (upholding a declaratory order of the
FCC that a monologue entitled "Filthy Words" could have been subject to administrative
sanctions); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (upholding a New York statute
that prohibited selling obscene material to minors under the age of seventeen).
402 United States v. Cirilo-Munoz, 139 F3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Spinney, 65 F.3d 231,237-38 (1st Cir. 1995).
4 03

See supranotes 353-92 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 376-79 and accompanying text.
4 05
See supranote 382 and accompanying text.
4 04
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in open defiance of the law; devoted zealots are often willing to suffer the earthly
406
consequences of their conduct to achieve notoriety for their causes.
Based on the evidence presented in PlannedParenthood,a prosecutor would
have ample evidence that the defendants intended to incite violence against
abortion providers when they published the Nuremberg Files. In fact, a prosecutor
would have far more evidence of several of the defendants' intent than would a
4 07
prosecutor in the run-of-the-mill criminal case.
The defendants' intent is not open to debate as it was in ClaiborneHardware,
Hess, or Abrams. The defendants formed an organization because they believed
in the use of violence against abortion providers; 40 8 they repeated those views in
writing, in interviews, in public and in private.40 9 They applauded violence
against abortion providers;4 10 they repeatedly worked to support people who
murdered or attempted to murder abortion providers 4 1 Their intent was
unequivocal.
B. The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment: The Imminence
Requirement
Brandenburg adopted a second requirement before a speaker can be
convicted for inciting others to commit criminal acts. The prosecution must show
that the criminal conduct urged by the speaker was imminent 4 12 Whether the
harm urged by the PlannedParenthooddefendants was sufficiently imminent is a
difficult question in light of little guidance from the Supreme Court. Since
Brandenburg,the Court has yet to find harm imminent in the two cases in which
4 13
it has faced the question.
This section examines Supreme Court precedent and concludes that the Court
4 14
has failed to offer meaningful guidance to assess the meaning of imminence.
Absent a clear answer from Supreme Court cases, this section then considers the
406 See

Stanford Class Project, supra note 6. Extremists like Paul Hill may even be
willing to suffer the death penalty to advance their cause.

407 United States v. Cirilo-Munoz, 139 F3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that the
criminal law does not place a special premium on direct evidence, and a defendant's intent may
be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the defendant); see also Wingfield v.

Massie, 122 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 1999); People ex rel. W.Y.B., 515 N.W.2d 453, 455
(S.D. N.Y. 1994).
4 08 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, at 16-17.
4 09 Seesupral.D.1.
4 10

See, e.g., supranotes 96-98 and accompanying text.
411 See, e.g., supranotes 99-102 and accompanying text.
4 12

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
4 14 See infra Part IV.3.1.
4 13 See
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justification for the imminence requirement and how that justification may help
the Court to draw a line between permissible and impermissible speech 4 15 This
section then considers whether the Planned Parenthood defendants have
threatened imminent harm.4 16 Because the defendants have preached their
message in an atmosphere of violence, the section concludes that were they
charged with inciting violence, a prosecutor would be able to demonstrate
17
sufficient imminent harm to satisfy the Supreme Court's Brandenburg test4
Not only is the threatened harm imminent the harm has occurred.
1. The CaseLaw
While Brandenburgarticulated the imminence requirement the Court did not
address whether Brandenburg's speech threatened a sufficiently imminent harm
to allow prosecution for inciting violence. 4 18 Both of the more recent cases have
found that the harm threatened by the defendant's speech was not sufficiently
imminent and, therefore, was protected by the First Amendment. Absent a case
in which the Court has found the harm sufficiently imminent defining the line
between imminent and remote harm may be difficult. But at a minimum, review
of the cases allows some basis to distinguish the facts in PlannedParenthood.
In Brandenburg, the Court did not need to discuss whether the harm was
imminent in light of its holding that the statute allowed the state to criminalize
mere advocacy of violence. 4 19 We can speculate whether the Court would have
upheld Brandenburg's conviction for inciting violence based on the scant
evidence presented. The evidence of an intent to incite violence was almost
certainly insufficient given his conditional threat of some unspecified kind of
future conduct. He stated only that although the Klan was not a "revengent
organization," if the federal government continued to "suppress the white,
Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance
taken." 420 While the conditional threat goes to absence of intent it also relates to
the lack of imminent harm. At most, he was threatening some kind of future
conduct. But we are left guessing whether he intended a lawful protest; an illegal
demonstration, a cross burning, or some other conduct.
For successful prosecution of Brandenburg, we can speculate that the
prosecution would have to prove some specific crime that Brandenburg was
encouraging. For example, proof that Brandenburg urged his listeners to storm the
state capitol building and forcibly occupy the governor's office would almost
4 15

See infra Part IV.B.2.

4 16

See infra Part IV.B.3.

4 17

jId

418 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969).
4 19

Id.at 448-49.

420

Idat 446.
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certainly be sufficient as long as he was also urging that the crime take place at
some reasonably proximate time in the future and as long as he did so in a setting
that created a realistic threat of the harm resulting from his incitement. 4 2 1 How
proximate the date, though, is far from settled.
Hess offers little more guidance.42 2 There, too, Hess's intent was uncertain.
The Court's independent review of the record left unclear whether Hess was
urging some future illegal conduct (taking the street later) or whether he was
urging restraint 4 2 3 But the Court suggested that the evidence of the imminent
harm was also insufficient. Even if his intent was to urge the demonstrators to
return at some point to retake the streets, the evidence did not demonstrate when
the crime was to take place. 424 The Court had no occasion to speculate on how
proximate the illegal conduct had to be to meet its imminence test. Imminence
invites line drawing and inevitably will involve some lack of precision, but Hess
offered no guidance on how a lower court might go about defining the required
proximity.
The only post-BrandenburgSupreme Court case that appears to be on point
is Claiborne Hardware4 25 There, Evers gave three speeches, one in 1966, the
426
other two in 1969, that formed part of the claim against him and the NAACP.
During the boycott, local boycott members formed an enforcement group and
collected names of African-Americans who violated the boycott.427 The
chancellor found that ten acts of violence against the boycott violators occurred
over the seven year boycott, but the chancellor specified when only five of those
occurred.4 28 The five episodes "identified in 1966 occurred weeks or months after
the April 1, 1966 speech. '4 29 That was insufficient to hold Evers liable because
the First Amendment allows a speaker "to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.
When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as

421 See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 360 (7th Cir. 1972) (reasoning that "[t]he
real question is whether particular speech is intended to and has such capacity to propel action
that it is reasonable to treat such speech as action"). Part of the problem in Brandenburgmust
have been the setting in which he made his remarks: he called local news reporters in an effort

to publicize the Klan rally. The film aired at trial showed a mere dozen Klansmen in attendance.
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 445-46. One can doubt that the dozen Klansmen presented a serious
risk of grave harm to the govemment.
422

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).

4 23

See id at 108-09.

4 24 See id
4 25
4 26

42 7

NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
See id at 926.

Id at 903-04.
4 28
See id at 904-06.
42 9

Id at 928.
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protected speech."430 That language suggests that imminence requires a close
temporal proximity, a matter of days, between the speech and the violent conduct
That conclusion would be misleading.
Not only did Claiborne Hardware involve civil liability, but it did so in a
case in which imposing liability for the entire amount of damage on the NAACP
and the regional director would have been especially unfair. Most of the harm to
White merchants, the target of a boycott by African-Americans pressing their
grievances for discriminatory behavior, resulted from lawful conduct 43 1 Liability
was premised on a few acts of violence by supporters of the boycott directed at
fellow African-Americans who violated the boycott. The injured merchants
sought to hold the NAACP liable based on Evers's conduct, limited to his three
432
speeches.
Although the Court's discussion left much to be desired, examined closely, it
is not creating a requirement that violence must have taken place before police
may intervene to arrest an inciter. Instead, the Court was dealing with the kind of
showing that a civil plaintiff must make before the plaintiff can recover damages
for harm caused. The criminal law does not always require actual harm before it
allows the police to intervene; for example, the law of solicitation, attempt and
conspiracy allows successful prosecution long before completion of the
substantive crime 4 33 Not so with civil liability that almost without exception
434
requires a showing of causation before recovery is allowed.
In its discussion of Evers's liability, the Court identified three grounds upon
which he could be found liable.435 Two of those grounds make obvious that the
Court had in mind the traditional causation requirement for civil liability. First, he
could be found liable if he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious
activity 4 36 The third basis of liability could result if he gave specific instructions
to carry out violence. 437 As in those examples, tort law holds liable tortfeasors
involved in a joint enterprise for acts that they have not committed if they have
agreed to or commanded those acts 4 38 The second basis of liability, that Evers's
430 Id.

431 See id at 886-87.
432 See id. at 929.
433
See DRESSLER, supranote 161, §§ 28.01[A] 28.02[A]--B].
434 SeeDIAMONDETAL., supranote 350, § 11.01 (1996).
435
436

ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 927.
Id

437 Id

438 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial

assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial
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speeches were likely to incite violence within a reasonable period of time, would
appear to address similar causation concerns. 439 Absent some close proximity
between his speeches and the violence, the causation connection becomes too
attenuated to allow liability to run to the speaker.440
To read ClaiborneHardwareto require violence to occur before the state can
intervene outside the context of civil liability is unwarranted. For example, we can
assume that the Communist Party cases would come out differently today;
therefore, merely urging the violent overthrow of the United States at some
imprecise time in the future would not be enough to allow the state to criminalize
the speaker. 44 1 But no one can doubt that the Court would uphold a state's
prosecution of a speaker who urged that a group of listeners forcibly take over the
headquarters of General Motors tomorrow. 442 Or, if we use the Klansmen
example, one cannot doubt that a state may criminalize a speaker who instead of
saying, "We ought to send all African-Americans back to Africa," or, "We ought
to kill all African Americans," says, "We should kill that African-American." 44 3
The First Amendment simply does not require that the state delays action until
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Id. See also, id§ 877.
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he (a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances
that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own, or (b) conducts an activity with the aid
of the other and is negligent in employing him, or (c) permits the other to act upon his premises
or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will
act tortiously, or (d) controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who
is likely to do harm ifnot controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control, or (e) has a duty to
provide protection for, or to have care used for the protection of; third persons or their property
and confides the performance of the duty to the other, who causes or fails to avert the harm by
failing to perform the duty.

Id.
439 See ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 927.
44 0
Where one person urges another to act, the law often has trouble holding that the
speaker caused the other person to act. That is so because the law views the actor's free choice
as the cause of his or her own conduct Indeed, in the criminal law, accomplice liability does not
turn on whether an accomplice's encouragement is a cause in fact of the crime committed. To
require the prosecutor to prove causation might allow an otherwise culpable offender to escape
criminal liability. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
InterpretationofDoctrine,73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 336-37 (1985); Dow & Shieldes, supra note
175, at 1242-44.
441 See supranotes 327-36 and accompanying text.
442 This would appear to be advocacy of action rather than advocacy of abstract doctrine.
As indicated in Yates v. United States, the former is not protected by the First Amendment. 354
U.S. 298 (1957).
443 Naming or otherwise targeting a victim makes implausible a claim that the speaker
was urging some abstract result.
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after harm has occurred. It is enough that the harm be imminent.4 4 Thus,
ClaiborneHardwareshould not be read to require that criminal liability is proper
445
only if lawless activity follows speech "within a reasonable period" of time.
Even the Holmes-Brandeis dissents, if we assume that the Court meant to
endorse their view in Brandenburg,do not offer clear guidance on the imminence
requirement. Cases like Whitney involved little more than participation in the
Communist Party.4 46 Whitney did not involve a defendant who called for an
illegal strike to shut down the government or an armed take-over of an industrial
plant. Abrams, according to Holmes, involved a case where the specific intent
was not proven and where the harm, interference with the war effort was not
sufficiently clear and present.447 In such a case, at a minimum, Holmes would
have required the prosecutor to make some meaningful showing that the
defendants' distribution of leaflets threatened some actual harm.448 But the
Holmes' opinion does not intimate how long a prosecutor would have to wait to
intervene. Other dissents offer little guidance as well.
The various cases do share one similarity that has increased the confusion
about the imminence requirement. In the early cases, the majority did not require
proof of any conduct beyond the defendants' speech; 449 in Brandenburg,Hess,
and perhaps ClaiborneHardware,the prosecutor and plaintiffs may have relied
on earlier precedent, resulting in their failure to present additional evidence
beyond the defendants' speech. As a result, the record in the various cases does
not demonstrate whether the defendants engaged in additional conduct that might
have suggested the existence of a criminal conspiracy or other more substantial
criminal behavior. The cases look like pure speech cases where the defendants are
dropped onto an empty stage and make a speech for which they are criminalized.
The cases do not explain the significance of the context in which the speech may
have been made.
To make the point more clearly, all we know about Brandenburg is that he
was a member of the Klan, he called the press and invited them to attend a Klan
rally, and the press showed up to a poorly attended rally where he gave a rather
incipid speech, at most suggesting some kind of conditional threat of possible
444 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01(2) (1974) (detailing the law of attempt).
445 NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,927 (1982).
446 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,363 (1927).
447 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
448

See id at 626-27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
449 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent It is a question ofproximity and degree.
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illegal conduct. 450 As presented, it was an exceedingly weak case, even under the
Espionage Act and Smith Act precedents 4 51 But we can only speculate how the
Court might have viewed a record demonstrating that Brandenburg's speech was
part of a concerted plan to intimidate members of the African-American
community, that Brandenburg made his statements in a context of violence
against African-Americans and Jews, or that Brandenburg intended the members
of his audience to commit acts of violence against minorities in the community.
What if Brandenburg gave a speech urging violence in a community in which
other acts of violence had recently taken place, such as targeting Jews and
African-Americans? 452 In that context, may the state prosecute the speaker for
inciting to violence?
One might be led to discount the significance of the context in which a person
makes the contested speech. The Supreme Court examined the relevance of the
political context only in Dennis.4 53 Given our historical advantage, we know that
the defendants' efforts to organize the Communist Party and to orchestrate the
violent overthrow of the capitalist system did not take place and, perhaps more to
the point, that the fear of such an overthrow was grossly exaggerated 4 54 The
plurality's willingness to take judicial notice of the Red Scare was only part of the
problem; almost certainly a prosecutor could have introduced evidence from
experts to demonstrate the extent of the Red Menace. Despite concern about the
historical overreaction to the threat of Communism, context should matter.
Context should matter because, if speech is made in an already violent
setting, that fact may demonstrate something about the speaker's intent in making
speech and about the likelihood that the speaker's words will have their intended
effect. Context is also relevant to assess whether harm is in fact imminent.4 55 As a
450

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,445-46 (1969).
451 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See also Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957), overruled in part by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
452 In Brandenburg,the Court summed up its earlier holdings as having fashioned a rule
requiring advocacy of imminent lawless action. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447. Presumably, the
speaker must urge the commission of a particular crime, i.e., the lawless action.
453
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (describing the Communist
Party as "the development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the

Government, in the context of world crisis after crisis").
454 Wells, supra note 220, at 7-8. See also Dow & Shieldes, supra note 175, at 1231
(explaining that Judge Hand, whose formulation of the clear and present danger test was
adopted in Dennis, had believed that a Communist threat was imminent and had compared the
Communist presence in Europe to the historical movement of Islam).
455 See, eg., Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 874 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that the
statement "I hear the President is coming to the base. I am going to get him" made from a
marine base by a marine to a telephone operator constituted a threat to the life of the President
because it was common knowledge that the President was expected to arrive at the marine base
the following day). Accord United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996);
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result, speech protected in one setting may not be in other settings. The problem
remains, though, that the Court has not ruled definitively on the relevance of
context.
Thus, because the Supreme Court upheld criminal convictions upon little
more than pure speech, the factual records in the various cases offer little
guidance about the context in which defendants made their speeches. The early
cases, upholding convictions, allowed conviction without imminent harm;
prosecutors did not need to prove any harm, other than remote theoretical
harm.4 5 6 The more recent cases reversed convictions in situations where the
speaker's intent was not clear and where we can only guess what crime the
defendant was urging or when that crime might take place, if at all.4 57 Because
the Court has not upheld a conviction under its revitalized Brandenburgtest, and
because prosecutors in the few recent cases did not anticipate heightened proof;
we can only speculate about the temporal proximity between speech and
threatened harm and whether a defendant's speech should be exanined in the
larger context in which the statement is made.
The absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court makes resolution of
the question posed in this article difficult, whether the conduct of the Planned
Parenthood defendants could be criminalized. Examination of the policies
supporting the imminence requirement does offer some help, as discussed in the
next sub-section.
2. Policies UnderlyingImminence
Imminence seems to allow the state to criminalize speech if the state can
show that listeners will act on the message of the speaker. The requirement has
been criticized because it seems to draw a line between ineffective and effective
speech: as long as one remains ineffectual, a "poor and puny anonymit[y]," 458 the
speaker is protected, but she loses her First Amendment protection once she
becomes an effective speaker. 459 Whether the imminence requirement makes

sense and how a court ought to apply the requirement to a particular set of facts
are best understood in light ofthe justification for the imminence requirement.
As with other aspects of the Court's First Amendment case law, the Court has
not carefully analyzed the justification for the imminence requirement" 60 But the
most important justification for the imminence requirement is that the answer to
Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d
1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987); Lucero v. Trosch, 904 F. Supp. 1336, 1340 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
456 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919).

457 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
4 58
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4 59
See generally TRIBE, supranote 175, at 616-17; Gunther, supranote 175, at 742-43.
460 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-49 (1969).
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bad speech, absent imminent harm, is more speech, rather than suppression of
speech. 46 1 Imminence is important for other reasons as well. For example, absent
imminent harm, proof that a speaker actually intended harm to result may be
more difficult but that justification relates more to rules of evidence than it does
to First Amendment theory. In some instances, absent imminent harm, the Court
may have been left to guess whether the speaker had the requisite intent to incite
4 62
violence
Justice Brandeis articulated thejustification for the imminence requirement in
his concurring opinion in nrhitney.4 63 There, he stated that "no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion." 4 64 If time exists for more speech, "the remedy to be applied is more
465
speech, not enforced silence."
The Espionage Act and Smith Act cases demonstrate how more speech may,
in theory, remedy disfavored speech. A free society ought to debate whether the
draft is constitutional, whether it ought to aid any particular country, or whether it
ought to change the form of government under which it is organized.4 66 Open
debate that Communism is the wrong form of government 4 67 or that the United
States had a vital interest in backing those opposing the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia 4 68 -that is, more speech--may be the appropriate response to members of
the Communist Party. In theory, a coherent debate between advocates of violent
overthrow of the government and those who favor the current system might
convince the "proletariat' to invest in the American system, rather than engaging
in industrial sabotage.
More speech may be a plausible remedy to "bad" speech if the speaker is
attacking governmental policies. Dissent plays a special role in a democracy, and
461 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
462
See e.g., Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
463 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("At best, however, the
statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.").
464

Id. at 377.
465 Id.
466

See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407
(1986) ("Democracy promises collective self-determination-a freedom to the people to decide
their own fate-and presupposes a debate on public issues that is (to use Justice Brennan's now
classic formula) 'uninhibited, robust, and wide open."') (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:A

Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHn. L. REv. 225, 226 (1992) ("The First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause was intended to assure the widest possible debate about matters of concern to the
community.").
4 67
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 464 (1951).
4 68
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

1240

OHIOSTATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1175

public officials may have special incentive and power to suppress their critics. In
that setting, protecting dissent furthers desirable social goals of allowing a fully
informed public debate on important issues. Forcing the government to justify
suppression of speech that may be political dissent, rather than a call to violence,
may be necessary in light of the incentive to suppress criticism and the power to
do it. Government also has the resources to protect itself as well.
While more speech may be the remedy in theory, the theory may not work as
well in practice-especially when speech targets private citizens. Presumably, a
debate between proponents of violence against abortion providers and other less
radical pro-life advocates is the appropriate remedy rather than criminalizing
Michael Bray for publishing A Time to Kill. Other writers or speakers may be able
to demonstrate that his thesis is morally and legally flawed and thereby prevent
the violence that he seemed to urge in his book. As events have demonstrated,
though, that debate took place and did not stop violence.4 69 And, although the
debate took place, many people who were influenced by Bray's book may not
have participated in the debate about the legality and morality ofmurder. 470
Despite problems with the theory, we may be willing to bear the risk as a cost
the
First Amendment At least that seems to be the case with the current state
of
of the law when Bray and other anti-abortionists attack current abortion doctrine.
That more speech is an appropriate remedy to "bad" speech makes less sense
when the target of the speech is a private individual, not the government. As
discussed above, public officials have power and incentive to silence dissent on
matters of public importance where public debate is necessary for fully informed
decision-making by voters and public officials.4 71 Postponing intervention until
police are certain that a speaker intends harm and represents a realistic threat
poses a risk, but the government retains resources to protect itself. Private
individuals are in a different position from governmental officials; while they may
have incentive to squelch criticism of their conduct, they may lack the resources
to do so or to protect themselves from attack. They also lack access to a public
forum in which they can plead their case, that is, where they can counter "bad"
472
speech with good speech, even if listeners are still open to be persuaded.
4 69

In light of continuing violence against abortion providers, mere speech does not seem

to have solved the problem.
470 See supra note 136.

471 See supranotes 342-52 and accompanying text.
472 That is part of the justification for the line between public and private figures in the
Supreme Court's First Amendment defamation law. See, eg., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
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Even if we accept that the risk that listeners will not be persuaded by more
speech as a cost of the First Amendment, the justification may help the Court to
draw a meaningful line between lawful and unlawful speech. Presumably, in a
case in which the state attempts to prove incitement to violence, the prosecution
must demonstrate the absence of time that would allow more speech to remedy
the threat created by the speech. That may be another way to characterize the
Court's imminence requirement.
Although the Court has offered no clear explanation of the relevance of the
context in which a speech may be -made, context ought to be relevant in
determining whether there is time for more speech. Whether a Klansman makes a
speech in a community with a long history of racial tolerance and peace, or in a
community that is in the midst of racial tension and violence, is relevant to
whether harm is imminent.
However, relying on context to define imminence may create some risks. For
example, as discussed above, the Espionage Act and Smith Act cases demonstrate
that the judiciary has overreached to the unsubstantiated threat of overthrow of the
government.4 73 The plurality in Dennisrelied on the perceived context to justify
criminalizing people who, according to the proof, did nothing more than advance
the long term agenda of the Communist Party.4 74 Hence, some commentators
4 75
have suggested that we need firmer protection for the First Amendment.
But focusing on the relevance of the context in which a person speaks does
not mean that we must return to the unhappy results in cases like Dennis.
Brandenburg and post-Brandenburg case law impose a stringent intent
requirement. 7 6 Were we able to revisit Dennis, and to see how it would be
decided consistent with modem precedent almost certainly, a prosecutor would
have to prove more than the defendants' adherence to principles of communism.
Even in a setting of violent action by radical organizations, a prosecutor would
still have to demonstrate that the defendants made their statements with a specific
intent to encourage the violent conduct 4 77 Thus, in Dennis, the government
would have to show not simply that the defendant urged the violent overthrow of
the capitalist system but that the defendant intended to encourage a specific act of
violence, for example, a violent and unlawful strike against a particular
manufacturer 4 7 8
473

474

See supraPart II.B.

See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 464, 511 (1951) (finding that "a highly
organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members... coupled with the inflammable
nature of world conditions... convince us that their convictions were justified on this score").
475
See generally Dowv & Shieldes, supranote 175, at 1218-19.
476
See supraPart lll.C-D.
477
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) ("And since there was no
evidence.., that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder,
those words could not be punished by the State ... ").
478 See, e.g., supranotes 441-48 and accompanying text.

1242

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1175

3. The Planned Parenthood Defendants
This section examines whether the PlannedParenthooddefendants posed a
threat of sufficiently imminent harm to allow them to be prosecuted under a
properly drawn statute criminalizing incitement to violence. It concludes that,
despite the uncertainties of the imminence requirement, the First Amendment
would not bar their prosecution. 479 To demonstrate how the imminence
requirement might apply to various activities of the defendants, this section first
considers how that requirement might apply to publication of A Time to Kill and
then turns to the broader question, focusing on all of the defendants' activities
relating to anti-abortion violence.
A Time to Kill may have inspired others to attempt murder 4 80 Despite some
hedging, Bray seems to have intended that his book lead to violence. 481 On that
assumption, it is nonetheless doubtful that the harm that Bray intended to incite
was sufficiently imminent to allow prosecution based on publication of the book
alone. The book makes a detailed Biblical and moral argument why violence is
justified; it also makes a rather uninformed legal argument based on inapplicable
precedent and ignores the overwhelming legal authority that flatly contradicts his
argument.4 82 But the book is abstract advocacy. He discusses his theory in the
abstract without targeting a particular individual 4 83 Although many of his readers
probably did not consider competing points of view, public debate about his
thesis did follow publication of the book.4 84 That is, there was an opportunity for
more speech before suppression of ideas; therefore, his argument is aimed at
governmental policy.
Publication of A Time to Kill would appear to be analogous to teaching
communist principles.4 85 We know whom Bray would like to see dead (all
abortion providers); but such generalized desire seems similar to the situation in
Dennis, a case which I have assumed would come out differently today in large
part because there was no proof that the defendants did more than make abstract

47 9

See infra Part IVB.3.
See supranote 462.
481 See supranotes 86-94 and accompanying text.
482
See supranotes 86-90, 161 and accompanying text.
483
But see supranote 378.
484 See Nightline Broadcast, supra note 92. Pat Mahoney of the Christian Defense
Coalition stated, "I'm very disturbed and upset. I'm really here, Forrest, for two reasons.
Number one, to address what Michael is saying. The use of violence at clinics solves nothing
practically." Id. See also 60 Minutes 11 Broadcast, supra note 80. Rev. Dowhower stated,
"What worries me most is that the word of God is misrepresented, that God is portrayed as this
vengeful moral absolutist who has made the eradication of abortion the all-important issue. The
all-important issue is God's love, not his vengeance." Id.
485 Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 464 (1951).
480
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arguments about the overthrow of the capitalist system 4 86 A person influenced by
the Dennis defendants might be moved to commit an act of political sabotage, but
487
we are just not willing to hold the writer accountable for such possibilities
But Bray and the other Planned Parenthooddefendants did not limit their
activities to publishing abstract arguments. Further, they engaged in provocative
behavior in an atmosphere of violence.4 88 That is, when judged in context, their
conduct has threatened imminent harm.
Anti-abortion violence began in the 1970's, 4 89 but with the murder of
Dr. Gunn, violence against individual abortion providers has increased
dramatically 4 90 As discussed above, since Gunn's murder, at least seven people
have been murdered as a result of violence directed against abortion providers and
eleven others wounded 4 9 1 Gunn's murder followed the publication of a wanted
poster, naming him as its target.492 Appearance on wanted posters has proved
deadly for other abortion providers as well. Both Drs. Patterson and Britton were
4 93
subjects of wanted posters before their deaths
Active in the pro-life movement for some time, the defendants became
involved in ACLA because they were unwilling to commit to non-violence after
Dr. Gunn's murder 4 94 Their activities since that time have demonstrated their
awareness that the very kinds of activities in which they have engaged have
resulted in violence. Aware of repeated acts of violence directed against abortion
providers, many of the Planned Parenthood defendants helped to create the
Deadly Dozen posters, the Nuremberg Files, and similar posters circulated in the
St. Louis area. 95 Publication of the Deadly Dozen posters resulted in immediate
4 86 See supranotes

327-36 and accompanying text.
487 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-19 (1957).
488 See supraPart I.D2.
489 See Wells, supranote 220, at 26-32.
490 See supra Part ll.E. See also Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee's Request
for Affirmance, Exhibit B, at 3, Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists,
(9th Cir. 2000) (No. 95-35320).
The Feminist Majority Foundation's sixth consecutive survey of anti-abortion violence
comes at the end of a year of tragic violence directed at abortion clinics and health care
personnel. The year began with the fatal bombing of the All Women, New Woman Clinic in
Birmingham, Alabama, which claimed the life of off-duty police officer Robert Sanderson, and
severely injured nurse Emily Lyons. This violence culminated with the fatal shooting of

Dr. Barnett Slepian on October 23,1998.
Id.

491 See supraPartII.E.

492 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 51, 5-6.
493

Id. at 8, 10.
494 Id at 15-16.
495
See supraPart l1.D.2.
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action by law enforcement agents. FBI agents immediately warned the subjects of
4 96
the poster that they were at risk and offered twenty-four hour a day protection
The reaction of law enforcement to publication of the Deadly Dozen poster is
strong evidence that the poster was an incitement to violence. In light of the
murders that followed publication of similar posters, the fear that someone would
use the information provided on the poster, not readily available elsewhere, to
commit murder was real. 497 The Nuremberg Files website poses a similar risk, as
demonstrated by the murder of Dr. Slepian.498 That is, the violence urged was not
just imminent, it was a continuation of violence already occurring.
While no deaths resulted from publication of posters targeting St. Louis area
abortion providers, the timing of the publication demonstrates why the conduct of
the Planned Parenthood defendants is not mere advocacy of violence but
incitement of imminent harm. The defendants are aware of the connection
between publication of the posters and subsequent violence directed at abortion
providers. 499 Many of them have worked with those who have committed violent
acts and encouraged them in their efforts.5 00 They must be aware that the killing
has begun and that their speech-that is, the posters-encourages violent action
by people in the anti-abortion movement, even if the Planned Parenthood
defendants endorse, but forego, violence themselves. 50 1 Publishing the St. Louis
posters to coincide with an ACLA conference in St. Louis should be treated as an
incitement to violence.
The activities of the PlannedParenthooddefendants do not amount to mere
abstract advocacy, but instead cross the line to incitement for another reason as
well. Part of the problem in cases like Brandenburgand Dennis is that evidence
of inciting a specific crime is vague.50 2 For example, a court or jury could not
know what crime Brandenburg was inciting because of his vague, conditional
threat.5 03 In the Communist Party cases, the overthrow of the capitalist system
would almost certainly result only if many people committed numerous specific
acts of violence (or perhaps, if a majority of Americans voted to adopt such a
system). Absent more specific exhortation, a court or jury could only guess what
5 04
crimes Communist Party officials were inciting.

4 96

Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132

(D. Or. 1999).
497 See supraPart II.D.2-E.
4 98
Id.
4 99

See supraPart II.D.2-E.
500 See supranotes 116-28 and accompanying text

501 See supraPart I.D.2.
502 See supranotes 332-36 and accompanying text.
503 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,446 (1969).
504
See supranotes 332-36 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, the Planned Parenthood defendants have identified potential
victims of violence. Naming doctors and their supporters, providing detailed
information helpful to a would-be murderer, and arguing passionately in favor of
killing is a far cry from making vague statements in support of the overthrow of
the capitalist system or from making theoretical arguments that killing abortion
providers is justified.505 Given the setting or context in which the defendants have
published specific information about doctors providing abortion, they have
crossed the line between protected and unprotected speech.
V. CONCLUSION
Radical anti-abortionists are not likely to be deterred by civil liability. The
PlannedParenthoodplaintiffs may recover little of the $107 million in damages
that the jury awarded. Substantial damage awards against other anti-abortion
groups 50 6 and the threat of damages in the Planned Parenthoodlitigation, filed
507
before the publication of the Nuremberg Files, did not deter the defendants
Not only will their conduct not be deterred, but, demonstrated by the continuing
violence against abortion providers, their conduct represents a serious threat to
human life. Criminalizing the defendants may be necessary to protect abortion
providers.
First Amendment scholars and commentators have been consistent in their
belief that the Planned Parenthooddefendants are entitled to First Amendment
protection.5 08 This article has argued that their conclusion is wrong. Many of the
defendants have left a paper trail, demonstrating their commitment to violence
and support of murder.50 9 Indeed, by comparison to many criminal cases,
505

See supraPart IV.
506 See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); see also Press
Release, Nat'l Org. for Women, NOW PresidentPatriciaIrelandLauds PlannedParenthood
Victory in Oregon Anti-Aborton Terrorism Case (Feb. 2, 1999), available at
http:/www.now.orgpress/02-99/02-02-99.html (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). On
remand:
NOW was victorious in its federal abortion rights case, NOW v. Scheidler, the first such
class action under the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The jury in that
case returned a unanimous verdict: Operation Rescue, Joe Scheidler and their co-defendants are
racketeers and will be liable for triple damages for all of the harm their violent acts have caused
to clinics.
Id.

507

The Nuremberg Files website was put on the Internet after litigation had already begun
between the parties. See Stanford Class Project, supra note 6 (stating that the Planned
Parenthoodsuit was filed in 1995 and that in January of 1997 the Nuremberg Files website was
created).
508
See supranotes Part II.B.
509 See, e.g., supranotes 74-90 and accompanying text.
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evidence of their intent to encourage violence is substantial, including writings,
public interviews, and inferences that may be drawn from their conduct.5 10 With
full knowledge of the violence that has followed publication of wanted posters,
the PlannedParenthooddefendants have continued to create similar documents
and publish them to make them accessible to those who may intend to commit
5 11
violent acts against abortion providers.
The Supreme Court's precedent involving incitement is hardly consistent or
clear. But close examination of the leading cases suggests that the Planned
Parenthood defendants' conduct has crossed the line between advocacy and
incitement.5 12 They are committed to ending abortion through whatever means
they can. They have identified specific targets of violence and have shared that
information with any would-be murderer.5 13 They are not "poor and puny
anonymities" 5 14 advocating radical reform; they are people committed to a
dangerous agenda.5 15
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See supraPart I.D.1.
See supranotes Part II.D.2.
See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., supranotes 354-57 and accompanying text
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
515
See supra Part IV.
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